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INTRODUCTION

Freedom of speech is one of the liberties of which Americans
are most proud.' As a result, perhaps it ought not be surprising
that what constitutes less than a single sentence of the
Constitution' is the subject matter of entire law school courses,
treatises,' and numerous books,4 in addition to numerous
Supreme Court and lower court cases and literally hundreds of
scholarly articles.' What would be much more surprising-to the
uninitiated, at least; it is common knowledge to those involved
with First Amendment law and scholarship-is the fact that all
these courses, cases, texts, treatises, and articles have failed to
produce any generally accepted framework for analysis of free
speech issues. Instead, First Amendment law seems to have
evolved into a morass of apparently unrelated, hyper-technical,
and generally incoherent three- and four- part tests that more
closely resemble the Internal Revenue Code and regulations than
it does anything else in the law.6
Even the most basic introductions to free speech doctrine
discuss the differences between protected speech, unprotected
speech, protected but disfavored speech-usually certain kinds of

1 STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE
159 (1990); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (explaining that
freedom of speech is indispensable).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom
of speech.").
' See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT (3d ed. 2010); MARTIN H.
REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984); RUSSELL L.
WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT (3d ed.

2009).
The Zief Law Library at the University of San Francisco School of Law, whose
collection is probably typical of law school libraries, has approximately 230 books
dedicated entirely to freedom of expression. Univ. of S.F. Libraries, Search for
"Freedom of Expression," DONCORE, http://doncore.usfca.eduliiilencore/search/
C_Sfreedom%20of%20expression?lang=eng (last visited May 16, 2013).
5 Actually, a Westlaw search of articles written on free speech terminated after
retrieving 10,000 such articles.
6 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARv. L. REV. 30, 98 (1993);
Frederick Schauer, Codifying the FirstAmendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP.
CT. REV. 285, 287-88, 316; Robert F. Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review in Free
Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 302, 302-03 (1984).
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sexual speech-and "less" protected (commercial) speech.' They
also uniformly apply different tests based on factors such as:
(1) whether the medium being regulated is mere unaided speech,
or if the human voice is somehow enhanced, whether the medium
is print, broadcast television or radio, cable-or, now, satellitetelevision or radio, telephones, microphones, or the internet;'
(2) where the speech occurs-private home, public forum, limited
public forum, nonpublic forum, in a bus,' in a home, outside a
home, or somewhere else;o (3) what aspect of the speech is being
regulated-content or viewpoint or time, place, or manner;"
(4) whether the regulation is some kind of prior restraint;12
(5) whether the statute regulating the speech contains certain
specific words;13 (6) the degree of care exercised by the speaker;14
(7) whether the restrictions implicate freedom of association;15
and (8) whether there is compelled speech."
All of these distinctions, and many more, appear to be
necessary because the exact three- or four- part test to be applied
depends on the precise combination of factors involved in each
These different tests and distinguishing factors are
case.
important." The problem, though, is that the focus on all of the
different three- and four-part tests makes it appear as if there
are either no underlying foundational principles for analysis of
free speech issues, or that there are so many "foundational"

7 JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A
NUTSHELL (4th ed. 2008); FARBER, supra note 3; ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N.
MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS (5th
ed. 2010); JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (4th ed. 2010).
8 BARRON & DIENES, supranote 7; FARBER, supra note 3.
9 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
10 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
See discussion infra Part I.A.
11 See discussion infra Part I.C.
12 Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
13 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978).
14 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
16 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984).
16 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958); BARRON &
DIENES, supra note 7; FARBER, supra note 3.
17 But see, e.g., Wallace Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judicial
Process:A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479, 483-85 (1964); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 949-51
(1987).
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issues, each of which requires its own special test, that even
these very "foundations" of the analysis are themselves so
intricate as to be incomprehensible.
Frustrated by the apparent lack of consistency and
comprehensibility of free speech cases, many scholars have
sought to set forth a more coherent theory of free speech.18 Each
theory typically begins with the scholar's own understanding of
the fundamental notions of why it is important to protect speech,
and builds from that understanding an organized set of
principles with which to analyze free speech problems."
Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court nor any other courts
have adopted these scholars' suggestions. Their theoretical
purity is outdone by their practical irrelevance.
In this Article, we approach the First Amendment not as
theoreticians or philosophers looking forward from first
principles, but by looking backwards, trying to make sense out of
already decided cases. Rather than suggest a new or alternative
set of principles that we believe the Court should consider, we
look back at the way the Court actually has approached free
speech cases, in an attempt to discover coherent patterns and
unifying principles. We conclude that what has been described
as an incoherent agglomeration of three- and four- part tests is
more accurately described as nothing more than an attempt to
apply what in fact are a very few clear, consistent, and coherent
principles.2 0 We show that, despite all of the complicated
doctrinal analysis and confusing and apparently contradictory

1" See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2004) (1948); JOHN STUART MILL, On
Liberty, reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS ch. 2 (John Gray ed., Oxford
University Press 1998) (1859); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A

PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
19 See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 18; MILL, supra note 18; SCHAUER, supra
note 18; Redish, supra note 18.
20 We do not suggest (or believe) that the Court's First Amendment framework
is "the correct one." It has significant flaws that are inevitable in any attempt to
establish three- and four-part tests as guides for what are essentially personal
judgments about what is demanded by justice in the context of more and more
complex and intertwined relationships between individuals and government.
Nonetheless, we believe that the Court's analysis is substantially more coherent and
consistent than either commentators or the Court itself understand it to be.

2012]

FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

837

tests that have developed in this area, the Court's basic approach
to free speech cases is not appreciably different from its approach
to other constitutional rights cases, or even from tort cases.
The overarching difference between speech and other
constitutional rights lies not in its inherent substantive
difference from other rights, but in the fact that speech is
ubiquitous and unavoidable. Everyone communicates all the
time and everywhere. As a result, there are many more cases
that implicate free speech rights than there are about any other
constitutional right. There are many factual setting that come to
courts again and again with only slight variation, and there are
also many more diverse setting in free speech cases than in cases
involving any other rights. In order to avoid courts' having to
weigh and balance every factor in every free speech case, the
Court has engaged in some categorical balancing, creating
categories of speech and of government action that allow
relatively simple disposition of many cases.
When these categories are used as aids to help courts
address the basic questions that arise in speech cases without
resorting to an in-depth analysis of every fact and every
judgment in every case that arises, they make cases easier to
resolve simply and efficiently. Difficulties and confusion arise,
though, when judges and Justices lose sight of the purposes these
tests and doctrines were designed to serve. Sometimes, judges
appear to forget that all of these categories are mere labels or
guides to help simplify the determination of the few very basic
issues that arise in virtually every case. They begin-and
continue-to view the categories themselves as more important
than the ultimate issues with which these categories were
designed to assist. When this happens, the doctrines and their
categories not only lose their value, but they confuse observers,
wreak havoc with decisions, and create the abyss we know as
current free speech doctrine.
In Part I of this Article, we set out some of the most
commonly used tests and doctrines in free speech cases, and
discuss how they are applied. These tests include: (1) forum
analysis; (2) employee speech; (3) determination of the kind of
restriction placed on speech-(a) time, place, or manner,
(b) content, (c) viewpoint, or (d) secondary effects; and
(4) determination of whether the speech is protected,
unprotected, or somehow protected but less so than other speech.
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For each doctrine and set of tests, we examine the basic
determinations that must be made before application and the
purposes the doctrines and tests serve. We suggest that all of
these tests and doctrines are useful tools to help answer the
three basic questions that we believe underlie not only virtually
all of free speech jurisprudence, but also the jurisprudence
relating to other constitutional rights, and even to tort law.
These three basic questions boil down to the following:
(1) Assuming that the government has somehow negatively
impacted a person's communication," does the government have
a constitutional duty to the would-be speaker with respect to its
action? (2) If the government has potentially breached a
constitutional duty with respect to the plaintiffs speech, has it
done so intentionally? and (3) if the government has intentionally
targeted the plaintiffs speech, is that restriction justified?22 Put
even more simply, virtually all of the free speech tests and
doctrines invented and applied by courts are simply devices to
help them determine duty, intention, and justification.
After setting out each of the doctrines and its accompanying
tests, we show how they can serve as effective shorthand for
answers to one or more of these three basic questions, and, as a
result, how they have become useful tools in free speech cases.
We then explain how major problems arise. The doctrines
become counterproductive when the doctrinal categories
overwhelm their proper roles as aids to answer the above simple
questions. When these doctrines are viewed as independent of
and primary to the issues of duty, intention, and justification,

21 We believe that the activity protected by the First Amendment
is basically
communication rather than simply speech. We believe this to be the case because the
Court has found the right to be at issue when government has interfered only with
listeners, and not simply when it interferes with speakers. See Caroline Mala
Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV.
939, 972 (stating that theories of free speech "support the right to hear and receive
information").
22 These same three questions-and more-must be answered when the Court
addresses any other constitutional right, such as due process rights. In fact, analysis
of free speech cases is inherently simpler than due process cases, because at least
the constitutional interest at stake-communication-is fairly clear. In due process
and equal protection cases the same three questions must be answered, but the
second question-whether government has caused an injury to a constitutionally
significant interest-becomes much more complicated because defining what
interests are constitutionally significant becomes a much more complex endeavor.
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rather than as shorthand for the answers to these questions, the
doctrines and the cases appear to be incomprehensible and selfcontradictory.
Finally, we suggest that often judges may fail to properly use
the tests as ways to answer the other basic questions because
they simply lose track of the role these tests were meant to play.
Other times, though, reliance on these doctrines allows judges to
present what are inherently normative judgments as nothing
more than factual determinations.23
Often, in free speech cases, conservative judges have come
down on the side of pro-life demonstrators, anti-drug
campaigners, Christianity, and the importance of preserving the
political role of wealth. Liberal Justices have come down on the
side of pro-choice demonstrators, gays, non-Christian minorities,
outcasts, and the non-wealthy. What is surprising is not which
side each group ultimately supported, but how often that support
was framed as nothing more than the application of a nonnormative, fact-based test to a given set of facts. One suspectsor at least we suspect-that there are value judgments at work in
many of these cases, and that it is those differing values that
make outcomes somewhat predictable. Yet outside of cases
dealing with political contributions,2 4 those value judgments are
rarely acknowledged and almost never actually debated within
the judicial opinions. Instead of addressing their normative
differences, judges cast votes that reflect these differences while
drafting opinions that appear to rely on nothing other than the
application of technical three- or four-part tests to the specific
facts of the case before them. We do not claim that the judges
They may simply be
are being consciously disingenuous.
unaware of how their value judgments shape their perceptions of
facts and their applications of the different tests. We assert only
that this happens regularly.
I.

STANDARD FREE SPEECH DOCTRINES

In this Part, we set out the most commonly used tests and
doctrines in free speech cases and discuss how they are applied
and the purposes they can serve. We also show the ways in
which the doctrines become apparently incoherent and
23
24

See discussion infra Part I.A.7.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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nonsensical when they are not used to serve their intended and
sensible purposes, but are instead used by judges to retroactively
justify decisions made for other, unrelated reasons. These tests
include: (1) forum analysis; (2) doctrines relating to employee
speech; (3) determination of the kind of restriction placed on
speech-(a) time, place, or manner restrictions, (b) content
restrictions, (c) viewpoint restrictions, or (d) restrictions on
secondary effects; and (4) determination of whether the speech is
protected, unprotected, or somehow protected but less so than
other speech.
For each of these doctrines, we set forth the relevant threeor four-part tests mandated by the doctrines and what these
doctrines accomplish. We show how these doctrines can be, and
have been, effectively used as shortcuts to answer the three
really important issues we have described above: duty, intention,
and justification. When the doctrines are so used, they make
sense within a simple and unified approach to free speech law as
it currently exists. At times, though, these analytical tools used
to help answer other, basic, questions are treated as the very
issues to be analyzed; the tools appear to be more important than
the questions they were designed to help answer. When this
happens, confusion and contradiction ensue.
While this
confusion and contradiction is sometimes innocent, it also
provides a simple way for courts to avoid announcing normative
judgments that underlie their decisions, and instead to frame
those judgments as mere determinations of facts.
A.

The Forum Doctrines

1.

Introduction
Almost every free speech case dedicates at least some
attention to determining the "forum," if any, in which speech is
being restricted. Each forum-as well as areas described as "not
a forum at all"---describes some aspect of the context in which the
speech restriction operates, and the type of forum in which
government is acting in turn determines the constitutional tests
which any speech restriction must pass.25
25 While government can and does restrict what can be communicated
on
private property--one's own, or the private property of another-most of the speech
cases the Court has considered have involved restrictions imposed on governmentowned property. As a result, each forum was originally defined with respect to
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The three "fora" in which speech typically occurs are referred
to as a "public forum," a "nonpublic forum," and a "limited public
forum."2 6 In addition to these actual fora, there are situations
described as "not a forum at all."2 7
In this Section, we briefly define each of these fora and set
forth their constitutional definitions and tests as generally
understood. We note some potential theoretical inconsistencies
and apparent contradictions in the doctrines. But we then show
that when the doctrines are appropriately applied to serve their
original purpose, these theoretical problems disappear. Finally,
we show that these doctrines are sometimes used by courts or
judges for purposes other than those which they serve so well.
Only when this occurs do these doctrines appear much more
complicated, confusing, and random than they properly are.
Defining the Forum and Its Tests
The Court first gave voice to the notion of the public forum in
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, where it
explained that the rights of the state to limit expressive activity
are sharply circumscribed in places such as streets and parks,
which "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions."28
2.

government-owned property. As discussed infra note 49, these standards have since
been found to govern most restrictions on privately owned property, so that they
have come to be an integral part of almost every free speech case. See, e.g, City of
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 45 (1994) (analyzing the right to free speech on private
property).
26 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
27 Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998).
28 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). The Court elaborated on this idea more recently in

InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness,Inc. v. Lee:

[Individuals have a right to use "streets and parks for communication of
views," [and] that ... right flowed from the fact that "streets and
parks .. . have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions." We confirmed this observation [when] we held that a residential
street was a public forum.
Our recent cases provide additional guidance on the characteristics of a
public forum .... [W]e noted that a traditional public forum is property
that has as "a principal purpose ... the free exchange of ideas." Moreover,
consistent with the notion that the government-like other property
owners-"has power to preserve the property under its control for the use
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Despite some differences among members of the Court about
the exact definition of the public forum," the Justices generally
agree on the constitutional tests to be applied to speech
restrictions imposed in such a forum. Speech restrictions in
public fora are subject to the strictest constitutional scrutiny. 0
Content-based restrictions of protected speech in the public
forum are subject to strict scrutiny.31 Restrictions in a public
forum based on the viewpoint of speech are either subject to the
same strict scrutiny as content-based restrictions or are invalid
per se-even if the speech is unprotected speech." Contentneutral restrictions of time, place, or manner are "valid provided
that they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the
information."3 3
At the opposite end of the spectrum from speech restrictions
in the public forum are situations in which there is "not a forum
at all."3
These cases are most obviously those in which
government itself is the speaker, simply spreading its own
message. 5 An example of government as speaker is the
president herself making a speech. We elect her in part because
of her ability to make speeches and because of the ideas she
to which it is lawfully dedicated," the government does not create a public
forum by inaction. Nor is a public forum created "whenever members of the
public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by the
Government." The decision n [sic] to create a public forum must instead be
made "by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse." Finally, we have recognized that the location of property also
has bearing because separation from acknowledged public areas may serve
to indicate that the separated property is a special enclave, subject to
greater restriction. 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
29 See discussion infra Part
I.A.7.

3o Int'1 Soc'y for KrishnaConsciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 678.

3' Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980). See discussion of content-based
restrictions and viewpoint-based restrictions infra Part I.C.1.
32 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 391 (1992).
3
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
As
discussed infra Part I.C.1, time, place, or manner restrictions are restrictions aimed
at harms such as preventing high noise levels at night where people are trying to
sleep. They restrict speech, but only incidentally and only to the extent necessary to
carry out legitimate government goals unrelated to the speech.
34 Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678
(1998).
35 See, e.g., id. at 675 (stating that, "public broadcasting
as a general matter
does not lend itself to scrutiny under the forum doctrine").
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either advocates or condemns; we expect her to continue to make
speeches advocating certain ideas and condemning others. No
one would suggest that the Constitution requires her to share her
podium with private persons seeking access to the same
audience.
Between the public forum, in which government restrictions
are subject to the strictest scrutiny, and "not a forum at all," in
which government has no obligation at all to assist others'
speech, are the "non-public forum" and the "limited public
forum." Typically, a non-public forum is used to describe a place
where government is conducting some business that is not open
to the general public, but that is open to some selected
Examples include public
speakers."
nongovernment
3
broadcasting stations that exercise discretion in programming,"
38
debates among the leading candidates for public office, and
similar situations where speech is carried on by a group that
includes only selected nongovernment representatives."
The Court set out the standards by which speech restrictions
in a nonpublic forum are to be evaluated in Perry Education
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, where it stated, "In
addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the state may
reserve the [nonpublic] forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech
is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view."4 0 In Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, the Court went on
to state, "To be consistent with the First Amendment, the
exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not be based
on the speaker's viewpoint and must otherwise be reasonable in
36 Id. at 679 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 805 (1985)).
1
Id. at 669. The Court there described a "non-public forum" more by reference
to what it is not than to what it is, stating that, "Where the property is not a
traditional public forum and the government has not chosen to create a designated
public forum, the property is either a nonpublic forum or not a forum at all." Id. at
678. While the Court has never defined what it means when it refers to some
government-owned property as "not a forum at all," its use of that term strongly
suggests that when the Court uses it, it means that no one has any cognizable first
amendment right to speak. Id.
38 Id. at 669.
39 Id. at 679 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 805 (1985)).
40 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
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light of the purpose of the property."4 1 Put another way,
government can restrict speaker access to a nonpublic forum "as
long as the restrictions are reasonable" and viewpoint neutral.42
For example, government can sponsor political debates and invite
only those candidates who appear to have some minimum
amount of popular support, but it cannot restrict such debates
only to candidates who agree with those currently in office.
The last type of forum, according to the Court, is a
designated, or limited, public forum.4' A limited public forum is
basically an area that government could, if it chose, close to all
speech activities, but that it chooses to make publicly available
for speech. 44 The limited public forum differs from the traditional
public forum in that while traditional public fora are open for
expressive activity regardless of the government's intent, the
limited public forum is a place that would otherwise not be open
for speech, but that is intentionally opened by the government for
expressive use by the general public or by a particular class of
speakers. 4 5
Examples of limited public fora can include
schoolrooms or auditoriums opened for use by the public when
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682.
See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46. Public property which is not
by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication is governed by different
standards. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981).
The Court recognized that the "First Amendment does not guarantee access to
property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government." Id. "In
addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the state may reserve the forum for
its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46. As the Court
has stated on several occasions, "[The State, no less than a private owner of
property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it
is lawfully dedicated." U.S. Postal Serv., 453 U.S. at 129-30 (quoting Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)).
43 "The Constitution forbids a state to enforce certain exclusions
from a forum
generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the
first place." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981) (university meeting
facilities); see also City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167, 176 (1976) (school board meeting); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975) (municipal theater). Although a state is not required to
indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so, it is bound
by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum. Reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest. Widmar, 454 U.S.
at 269-70.
4
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
4
See id. at 677.
4'

42
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school is not in session."6 The school need not allow the public to
use the facilities at all, but if it decides to open up the facilities
generally for public use, those facilities become a limited public
forum.
Governmental action in a limited public forum is subject to
standards similar to those in a nonpublic forum, in that there is
applied a kind of mid-level review. 47 Basically, in a limited public
forum, government can enact restrictions on speech so long as
those restrictions are "reasonable in light of the purpose served
by the forum and are viewpoint neutral."48 As a result, if public
schools allow people to use classrooms for "discussion groups"
during the evenings so long as they do not damage or rearrange
the room, it will have created a limited public forum. If public
schools allow groups to use the classrooms to have proDemocratic discussion groups, but not pro-Republican discussion
groups, the "viewpoint discrimination" inherent in the restriction
will invalidate that restriction. 49 In another context, if public

46 But see Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) ("We
have previously declined to decide whether a school district's opening of its facilities
pursuant to N.Y. Educ. Law § 414 creates a limited or a traditional public
forum .... Because the parties have agreed that Milford created a limited public
forum when it opened its facilities in 1992 ... we need not resolve the issue here.
Instead, we simply will assume that Milford operates a limited public forum.")
(citations omitted).
47 In Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984), the
Court stated that speech limitations in a nonpublic forum are "valid provided that
they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information"-a
relaxed level of scrutiny. See also discussion infra Part I.A.4.
4 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93
(1993). In Good News Club, the Court stated that "When the State establishes a
limited public forum, the State is not required to and does not allow persons to
engage in every type of speech. The State may be justified 'in reserving [its forum]
for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.'" 533 U.S. at 106 (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). "The
State's power to restrict speech, however, is not without limits. The restriction must
not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint ... and the restriction
must be 'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.'" Id. at 106-07
(citation omitted) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
49 While the Court has not attached a particular "forum" label to speech
restrictions that operate on private property, it has made it clear that the tests for
restrictions of speech on one's own private property are essentially the same as-or
even more stringent than-those for restrictions on speech in the public forum. The
private property of one who is not the speaker is also subject to regulation similar to
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schools decide to allow theatre groups to use the school
auditorium to present shows open to the public, it would not
thereby be required to also open up that theatre for political
discussion groups closed to the public.
3.

Common Sense of the Forum Doctrines
There is intuitive appeal to these forum classifications and
restrictions. To begin with the most restrictive of these, "not a
forum at all," it would be difficult to find anyone to seriously
suggest that in areas where government is speaking or is
carrying on a business, and where it needs to control the internal
environment in order to accomplish its own legitimate purpose, it
is nonetheless somehow constitutionally mandated to permit
outsiders to come in and disrupt those activities at will. If the
president is holding a news conference, making a speech, or
having a meeting with a foreign head of state, he need not invite
the general public to join him. If police are driving in their squad
car, they need not invite strangers to come in and talk.
Because the reach and property ownership of government is
so significant, there are a great many places that are "not a
forum at all." For example, a place familiar to lawyers where the
government operates on its own behalf, and thus where it
generally has no duty to protect the speech of others, is the

that of the public forum. As Justice Thomas stated in Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton:
[lt would be puzzling if regulations of speech taking place on another
citizen's private property warranted greater scrutiny than regulations of
speech taking place in public forums. Common sense and our precedent say
just the opposite. In Hynes, the Court explained: "'Of all the methods of
spreading unpopular ideas, [house-to-house canvassing] seems the least
entitled to extensive protection. The possibilities of persuasion are slight
compared with the certainties of annoyance. Great as is the value of
exposing citizens to novel views, home is one place where a man ought to be
able to shut himself up in his own ideas if he desires.'". . . In Ward, the
Court held that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate "even in a public
forum,". . . appropriately recognizing that speech enjoys greater protection
in a public forum that has been opened to all citizens .... Indeed, we have
held that the mere proximity of private residential property to a public
forum permits more extensive regulation of speech taking place at the
public forum than would otherwise be allowed. Surely then, intermediate
scrutiny applies to a content-neutral regulation of speech that occurs not
just near, but at, another citizen's private residence.
536 U.S. 150, 176 (2002) (second and third alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
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courtroom."o The judge is conducting the legitimate government
business of finding the facts and applying the proper law to the
case at hand; and in conducting that business, she can set the
rules necessary to accomplish her legitimate judicial goals. The
judge is in strict control of what can be said and done. She
determines who can speak, for how long they can speak, how
loud, what questions the witness shall and shall not answer, and
even the manner in which people speak and dress.5 ' She is
carrying out the judicial function. She is "proprietor" of the
As such, her control of the content and
courtroom.5 2
perspective-viewpoint--of all that gets said in her courtroom is
not only accepted, but required by law.
To hold that the witness stand in a courtroom is "not a
forum" for private speech can be a simple and convenient way to
explain that government is constitutionally permitted to conduct
its own legitimate business, and when doing so it has no
affirmative constitutional duty or obligation to allow individuals
to speak in any way that interferes with that business.
Other branches of government can similarly limit speech to
the extent necessary to allow them to conduct business, and are
similarly not fora for private speech when they are doing so.
Legislatures may require observers not to interfere with debates,
and the executive branch may exclude the public from cabinet
and other meetings. Under the Constitution, neither branch
needs to let outsiders either hear or participate in the discussions
that they may have in the course of doing their government work;

50 Because the judiciary enforces the rules put in place by other branches of
government-as well as the common law, we generally think of the courts and their
personnel as an integral part of the government rather than as a proprietorship
conducting business. Indeed, courts are the primary mechanism for enforcement of
the rules and regulations made by government, and it may at first appear
nonsensical to speak of courts as anything but the epitome of government acting as a
maker and enforcer of rules. Without rules to implement, the courts would be either
nonexistent or at least irrelevant. While the purpose of the judicial process is to
resolve disputes by enforcing the law, the conduct of that judicial process is itself an
example of the government-or in this case the judge as the agent of governmentacting as "proprietor" of a business rather than as rule-maker or rule-enforcer.
* Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51
UCLA L. REV. 705, 725 (2004) (quoting Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and
the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 689-90 (1997)).
52 Id. at 710-11.
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and if and when they do decide to take input from others, they
themselves determine when, where, and how they will do so-for
example, by written statements, oral statements, etc.
To go a bit further, municipal libraries may select some
books for their shelves but not others; the military may prescribe
severe limits on communication, so long as they are in the service
of training and accomplishing its assigned missions;53 and post
offices may limit behaviors and speech that would interfere with
their proper functioning. 4
Government also acts on its own behalf as proprietor of
schools." The Board of Education can determine the curriculum
for public school teachers-from kindergarten through graduate
school-to follow, and teachers in turn can determine which
students speak, what they talk about, and how they talk about it,
whether in the classroom, or the auditorium if school-sponsored
assemblies, or in the school paper, so long as the actions are in
support of the school's legitimate mission.s

6

Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976).
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 734-35 (1990).
s We discuss the role of government in education in Joshua P. Davis & Joshua
D. Rosenberg, The InherentStructure of Free Speech Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 131, 141-42 (2010).
56 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
" Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271, 273 (1988). See David
A. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial
Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477, 504-05 (1981) (discussing a pre-Hazelwood Second
Circuit precedent); Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School District and the
Role of FirstAmendment Institutions, 1988 DuKE L.J. 685, 692-93.
58 One might reasonably confuse the issue of whether government is acting
as
regulator or as proprietor with the issue of whether government has an important
reason for restricting speech. Government may restrict speech, regardless of the role
in which it is acting, if it can show that the restriction is narrowly tailored to
accomplish a compelling government interest. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy
Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (applying strict scrutiny to a
Congressional statute regulating cable television). As a result, if government can
show that restricting student speech in the classroom and requiring students to
speak accurately about topics such as history and science is essential if schools are
going to educate students, it can enact these restrictions on student speech
regardless of the role in which it is acting.
While this presents an appealingly simple explanation of the school cases, its
simplicity is not matched by consistency or accuracy. It would be difficult, if not
impossible, for government to show that any particular speech, answer, or subject
matter is really so essential a part of all education as to be considered a "compelling"
interest. While government might be able to establish that its compelling interest is
in requiring students to learn obedience and attention to teachers, every public
school does much more than that. It also dictates subject matter and determines the
correctness of viewpoints expressed.
6
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To hold that these situations are not fora for private speech
makes perfect sense when it means simply that government is
entitled to speak and to carry on its own legitimate business, on
its own behalf, and on its own legitimate terms. The government
simply has no constitutional obligation to allow others to control
the way it speaks or carries on that business.' 9
When government is not legitimately speaking or carrying on
its own business, things change. There are contexts where
people have always spoken freely, where they feel entitled to
speak freely, where they assume that their speech is
constitutionally protected. For example, people have always
expected to speak in public parks and on public sidewalks."
The more significant response, though, is that when government functions as
proprietor, it is never even held to a standard anywhere near strict scrutiny. See,
e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to
prison mail regulations); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356-58 (1980) (upholding
military regulation under lightened standard). Instead, once a court is convinced
that government is acting as proprietor, any restrictions it enacts in that role will be
upheld so long as there is any rational basis for those restrictions. Compare Turner,
482 U.S. at 89 ("[Wlhen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.") (emphasis added), with Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83
(2000) ("States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the
Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.") (emphasis added). Courts will uphold required courses in
Medieval History as readily as they will uphold required courses in basic English.
We do not mean to suggest that determining when school activities or requirements
are within government's legitimate role as proprietor is always and easy question.
We suggest only that it is the appropriate question in these cases. See generally
Joshua Davis & Joshua Rosenberg, Government as Patron or Regulator in the
Student Speech Cases, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1047 (2009).
5 There has been some dispute about the extent to which determining the
content of what appears in the school paper or what is said in a school assembly is
actually a legitimate part of the educational program of the school, and if so,
whether the more significant part of that educational program is teaching selfrestraint or teaching tolerance. Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 271
(holding that a school may limit a school paper's content to further educational goals
to ensure material inappropriate for certain age groups does not reach them), with
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 681 (holding schools may limit student speech
in order to "inculcate" students with the "fundamental value" of tolerance for
divergent views). We do not mean to weigh in on the debate about the extent of the
school's constitutionally legitimate mission. We mean only that if it is determined
that some action is part of that mission, then when the school carries out its actions,
it is acting as proprietor of the school rather than as regulator, so that its
constitutional duties are limited.
6 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714-15 (2000) (describing sidewalks
as " 'quintessential' public forums"); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 130-32 (1981) ("This Court has not hesitated in the past to
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Indeed, if they could not speak there, the First Amendment
would have virtually no meaning at all-except, perhaps, to allow
people to speak only inside their own homes. When government
has contact with individuals in these contexts, it is not acting on
its own behalf, but is acting-as governments traditionally doas a ruler and regulator of its subordinates. For those who
subscribe to the notion that the Constitution functions only as a
limit on government action and not as an actual positive grant of
rights to individuals,"1 it is only in that role of regulator of others,
rather than as speaker or actor on its own behalf, that
government is subject to significant constitutional restrictions. It
has a constitutional duty to respect the speech-and other
constitutionally guaranteed-rights of its subjects. To suggest
that government can regulate speech in these areas so long as
that regulation is only "reasonable" would essentially strip the
First Amendment of any independent meaning because any
government action must be reasonable in order to survive even a
simple Due Process challenge, regardless of its subject. Thus,
governmental action in the public forum is subject to a
significantly higher level of scrutiny.6 2
4.

Theoretical Problems with the Forum Doctrines
The fact that a particular context is not a forum for speech
does not necessarily mean that government can act in any way it
wants without constitutional restraint. As discussed earlier, a
courtroom is a nonpublic forum-or not a forum at all-and the
judge's strict control of what can be said in the courtroom is
generally constitutional." Nonetheless, consider the judge who
includes testimony and allows argument only if it is proAmerican, regardless of its relevance to the matter at issue, and
who excludes any evidence or argument that is anti-American.
That restriction would clearly be unconstitutional, regardless of

hold invalid laws .. . which too broadly inhibited the access of persons to traditional
First Amendment forums such as the public streets and parks.").
61 See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV.
2271, 2273-74 (1990).
62 For a discussion of time, place, and manner regulations, content
and
viewpoint based regulations, and the exact level of scrutiny required for each, see
infra Part I.C.1.
6 Peters, supra note 51, at 710-11, 730.
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anything to do with any kind of forum. So would the behavior of
a public school that counted as correct only those answers that
displayed a pro-Republican bias.
As explained earlier, government can restrict speaker access
to a nonpublic forum only "so long as the distinctions. . . are

reasonable ... and are viewpoint neutral.""' The problem with
this "reasonable and viewpoint neutral" test is that while it
properly limits the judge's constitutional capacity to admit only
pro-American testimony and limits the teachers' constitutional
ability to reward only pro-Republican statements while
punishing pro-Democratic ones, it goes too far. The teacher
required to be entirely viewpoint neutral would have to reward
wrong answers to the same extent as correct ones. Similarly, the
judge would be prohibited from making virtually any ruling on
any argument made by either the plaintiff or the defendant. It
would simply be impossible for her to be "viewpoint neutral" in
the restrictions she puts on speech in her courtroom, as it would
be for the teacher in the classroom. Indeed it is the very job of
the judge and the teacher to determine which viewpoints are
correct and which are wrong.
While the requirement of viewpoint neutrality sometimes
demands too much, the same test for speech in a nonpublic forum
seems to demand too little. For example, if a town decided to
build a four-block square that people could use only to talk about
the current city administration, it would appear that the square
was not a public forum because it was built for the sole purpose
of discussing current office-holders. If that were the case, then
limiting the area to speech only about current officeholders would
appear to be constitutionally acceptable, because the restriction
relates to content rather than viewpoint, and because the
restriction, though seemingly unreasonable, is "reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum."6 Despite these facts,
though, no one can doubt that the construction and use of this
square for its intended purpose would be struck down.
There are problems with application of the forum doctrines
in the public forum as well. For example, consider a public
park-a public forum-where people are allowed to carry and
hold signs. Assume that while the park is open, though, Ms.

64
65

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Edue. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
Id. (emphasis added).
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Parkcloser holds a big sign at the entrance to the park that says,
"Do Not Enter: Park Closed," so that all would-be visitors are
deterred from coming in. By definition, a park is a "public
forum." As a result, any content or viewpoint-based restriction
on speech in a park is unconstitutional under the forum
doctrines. Since people carrying signs that read, "This park is
open. Come in" would be allowed to make their point, the
restriction of signs that misrepresent the park's status appears to
be a clear example of that unacceptable viewpoint
discrimination.6 ' The result would appear to be unconstitutional
content discrimination in a public forum. Nonetheless, there is
little doubt that the park could, one way or another,
constitutionally require Ms. Parkcloser to remove her sign from
the park entrance. Any other ruling could lead to chaos.
There are other contexts where rigid application of public
forum doctrines would simply fail to capture the basic intuition
behind these doctrines. For example, a town can constitutionally
grant permits for exclusive use of some field in the park on a
first-come first-served basis, even though the result is that the
group that reserves that field for a particular day has been
designated by the town to determine who can say what-content
discrimination-at that field on that date.6 ' The Court has often
explained that the granting of such exclusive use permits for
public fora can be upheld even though the permit-holder is not
content neutral because-and only when-the permit process is
"content neutral," so that it does not discriminate against speech.
Even though the licensing may take place in the public forum, it
is treated as a "time, place, or manner restriction," and as such is
acceptable even within that public forum. 8
Consider, though, a town that enacts a law requiring people
to file an application with the town for "speaking time" on town
sidewalks, rather than in particular parts of a park. Whoever
files first may speak for the time they reserve. Others may, in
turn, sign up with city hall to reserve their own speaking time.
Under the announced rules for the public forum, the results of
6 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992). See discussion
infra notes 290-96 and accompanying text.
67 See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 649
(1981) (upholding a first-come, first-serve regulation for state fairgrounds space).
6 See, e.g., Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002) (construing a
public park ordinance requiring a permit for certain gatherings as a "time, place,
and manner regulation").
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licensing speaking times in parks and on sidewalks ought to be
identical because they are both public fora. In reality, these
situations should not be and would not be treated the same. Any
court would conclude that permits for park bandstands are valid,
but that permits for speaking on sidewalks are not.
In addition to problems in applying the tests for various fora,
there are also significant definitional problems that can arise.
For example, if a park is a "public forum," can government
nonetheless put in buildings or areas such as storage sheds or
police stations reserved exclusively for government use? If
airports are not public fora, does that mean that they can allow
individuals in the public areas of an airport to discuss the local
sports teams but not other teams because one of the purposes of
the airport is to encourage local pride?
An Answer: The Proper Functions of the Forum Doctrines
Clearly, if the forum doctrines are taken as pronouncements
carved in stone from on high, and if they are applied rigidly, they
do not always work. If the doctrines are taken as ends in
themselves that must always be adhered to, they can lead to
significant complications as well as wrong and conflicting
answers, and they make free speech doctrine appear
unnecessarily and incomprehensibly complicated. We suggest,
though, that the forum doctrines are not ends in themselves, but
that they are merely helpful ways to another end. The forum
doctrines make sense when, and only when, they are seen as
ways to represent a court's determination regarding the existence
of a constitutional duty on government to accommodate
individual speech in any particular context.
One might suggest, and many people believe, that
government always has a duty to avoid interfering with a
person's right to free speech, regardless of the context."
Nonetheless, several decisions of the current Court, past
Supreme Courts, and other courts seem to belie that conclusion. 0
5.

69 Patricia
R. Stembridge, Note, Adjusting Absolutism: First Amendment
Protection for the Fringe, 80 B.U. L. REV. 907, 912-13 (2000) (discussing various
approaches to first amendment absolutism); see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 274-75 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the first amendment
"absolutely" restricts regulation of speech on a proposed piece of legislation).
70 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) ("The Free
Speech clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate
government speech"); see also Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th
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It is true that government cannot act in a way that infringes on
constitutional interests. But for many on the current Court, it
appears that in order to determine whether government infringes
on a constitutional right to freedom of speech, one must first
determine whether the speaker had a constitutional right to
speak in the first place. Whether the speaker potentially had a
constitutional right to speak in turn depends on whether
government had a constitutional duty to the would-be speaker. 2
The utility of forum analysis to the current Court rests on
the implicit, but important, assumption that when government
speaks on its own behalf, or when government is acting
legitimately as a proprietor carrying on its own business, it has
no duty at all to attend to the speech of others. Instead, a
majority of the Court seems committed to the idea that
government itself has the right to speak or conduct business on
its own behalf without interference from others."
Since
government is free to speak and to conduct its own business on
its own behalf, it is only when it is engaging in neither of these
activities that government has any duty to avoid interference
with others' speech. In other words, it is only when government
Cir. 1998) ("When a police officer has probable cause to believe that a person is
committing a particular public offense, he is justified in arresting that person, even
if the offender may be speaking at the time that he is arrested.").
n1 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797
(1985) ("The issue presented is whether respondents have a First Amendment right
to solicit contributions that was violated by their exclusion from the CFC."
(emphasis added)).
72 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 467 (2009) (holding that the government did not
have a duty to refrain from interfering with an individual's right to free speech when
the government was engaged in government speech).
13 In Summum, the Court stated as follows:
The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech;
it does not regulate government speech.... A government entity has the
right to "speak for itself." . .. and to select the views that it wants to
express.

...

Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it
lacked this freedom. "Ifevery citizen were to have a right to insist that no
one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate
over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the
private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically
transformed....
A government entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views
when it receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of
delivering a government-controlled message.
Id. at 467-68 (citations omitted).
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acts in its capacity as regulator of, or rule-maker for, the
behavior of others that it has any duty to consider the speech of
others.
The various fora, in turn, represent the role in which
government is acting, and provide appropriate rules for such
actions. If the government is either speaking on its own behalf or
legitimately carrying on its own business, it has no duty to
accommodate the speech of others. The public forum doctrine
simply means that when government acts in its other capacityas regulator-it is subject to constitutional duties with respect to
the speech of others. The entire idea behind the limited public
forum doctrine is to enable courts to determine the role in which
government is acting when the issue is not obvious to all. It
provides guidance when it is neither clearly government acting
on its own behalf nor a clear example of government regulating.
To see how this applies by returning to earlier examples,
consider first the prototypical public fora-parks and sidewalks."
While it is true that government is likely the proprietor-or at
least the owner-of the park or sidewalk, its legitimate
proprietorship extends for the most part only to the maintenance
and upkeep of the sidewalk or park. When government imposes
limits and restrictions on speech in parks and sidewalks, it is
acting not as proprietor of the grounds, but as a lawmaker or
"regulator," of speech. The determination that these areas are
public fora means simply that when government limits speech in
these areas-that is, in public fora-it is "regulating" the speech
of private persons rather than itself speaking or carrying on its
own business.
As a regulator, government has a clear
constitutional duty to respect the speech of others.
Of course, there is little doubt that the park in the above
example could require Ms. Parkcloser to remove her sign saying
"Park Closed" from the park entrance without violating the
Constitution. This is because when the park eliminates the
misleading sign at the entrance, it is doing so not as a regulator,
but pursuant to its legitimate role as proprietorof the park. It is
merely carrying on the business of operating the park in a
manner that allows people to take advantage of its existence.
Unlike most speech restrictions in a park, the act of ensuring
that people are not wrongly turned away at the entrance to a
7

See supra Part I.A.3.
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park represents government protecting its own ability to carry on
its own business-park operations-more than it does a
regulation. Whether or not a park is generally a public forum,
the viewpoint-based restriction in this case is an obviously
legitimate part of government's role as proprietor of the park,
and as such will be permitted. No real court would ever say
simply that the park is a public forum, the restriction is
viewpoint based, so the restriction is unconstitutional.
In addition, recall that a town can constitutionally grant
permits for exclusive use of some field in the park on a first-come
first-served basis, because the granting of such exclusive use
permits for public fora can be upheld so long as the permit
process is "content neutral." Despite the fact that sidewalks, as
parks, are public fora, no one would suggest that any town could
constitutionally license speaking time on sidewalks regardless of
the process. The difference, not reflected in the enunciated
doctrine but nonetheless entirely sensible, is that towns have
traditionally licensed certain park areas to groups for limited
periods, so that doing so appears to be nothing more than the
typical, legitimate "proprietorship" over parks in which public
entities routinely engage. Licensing speaking times on public
sidewalks, on the other hand, would appear to be outside of
anything one might expect or approve of as part of the legitimate
proprietary role that government plays with respect to a
sidewalk. When the forum doctrines are viewed not as ends in
themselves, but as relatively accurate representations of the role
in which government is acting, which in turn determines
whether or not government owes a duty to would-be speakers,
they make perfect sense.
Next, consider the actions of the pro-American judge in the
courtroom.
No one would suggest that the actions are
Nonetheless, the justification
constitutionally permissible.
cannot be simply that the restriction is not viewpoint neutral,
because to require the judge to be viewpoint neutral would be to
require the impossible.
The case becomes simple if one
understands that government is constitutionally permitted to
conduct its own legitimate business, such as trying cases, and
when doing so it has no affirmative constitutional duty or
obligation to allow individuals to speak in any way that
"

See supra Part I.A.4.
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interferes with that business. It can make rulings based on
content and viewpoint. To hold that the witness stand in a
courtroom is generally "not a forum" for private speech can be a
simple and convenient way to explain that government is
typically simply acting as proprietor when it tries cases. When
the judge excludes testimony that may be anti-American, it is not
the viewpoint discrimination that makes the action
unconstitutional. It is the fact that the judge who restricts
speech because it appears anti-American is acting outside her
constitutionally legitimate role as proprietor of the courtroom.
Because she is so doing, she is not shielded by the right that
government has to act legitimately on its own behalf without
concern for others. Instead, she is subject to the constitutional
duty imposed on government acting as regulator, and must
respect freedom of speech.
Similarly, while teachers can often discriminate on the basis
of viewpoints, there are certain times when by their actionssuch as censoring pro-Democratic speech and rewarding proRepublican speech-they make it clear that they are acting
outside of any conceivably legitimate constitutional role as
proprietor of the school. In those cases, their actions are not
shielded by government's right to act on its own behalf. Instead,
the teacher's actions are subject to constraints of the Free Speech
clause.
In both of these cases, the speech-of the judge and of the
teacher-would likely be struck down under the forum doctrines
because it was not "reasonable" in light of the purposes to be
served by the forum-in addition to its lack of viewpoint
neutrality. If that "reasonableness" requirement is understood to
mean nothing more than that government is not acting
reasonably when it takes actions not compatible with its
legitimate proprietorship, that part of the forum doctrine makes
complete sense. If it is understood as meaning anything different
from that, though, it leads only to confusion.
All of these cases are simple if the forumdoctrines are seen
as labels to represent the role in which government is acting-in
order to determine whether government has a duty to
accommodate speech in the context at issue. If government is
76 For example, if reasonableness were interpreted to mean nothing more than
rational basis review, which is the case in much of constitutional law.
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legitimately speaking on its own behalf or acting as proprietor of
a business, it owes no duty to accommodate private speech. It
can ensure that people actually know whether or not a park is
open, and it can grant permits for use of a bandstand or field. On
the other hand, if government is not itself operating in a
protected role-as a legitimate proprietor of a business or as a
speaker-but is acting as a regulator of its subjects, then
government has a duty to accommodate private speech.
Licensing speaking time on sidewalks is simply outside any
legitimate action government could take as "proprietor" of the
sidewalks, as is a judge admitting only pro-American testimony
or a teacher allowing only pro-Republican statements. None of
these represent government acting in anything like a legitimate
proprietary function, so in none of these situations would
government be free of a constitutional duty to accommodate
speech.
6.

Use of the Forum Doctrines in Service of Their Purpose
To preserve the forum doctrines as helpful tools to represent
whether government is acting as a regulator, and is thus subject
to constitutional scrutiny, or whether it is legitimately acting on
its own behalf and is exempt from such scrutiny, courts have at
times adjusted the forum definitions and doctrines to fit the
context in which cases arise. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and EducationalFund, Inc., where the Court was faced
with a challenge to the "Combined Federal Campaign" ("CFC"), it
adjusted the forum definition to suit the forum doctrine's
intended function. In that case, the CFC was a fundraising
campaign sponsored by the government to raise funds from
federal employees.77 The CFC, by way of the various government
agency employers, sent to federal employees at their workplace
brochures and collection envelopes soliciting contributions to the
CFC, which in turn divided the proceeds between its selected
beneficiaries.78
The petitioner, NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., which was not one of those selected
beneficiaries and not otherwise permitted to solicit in the federal
workplace, brought suit against the CFC."
77
7
79

473 U.S. 788, 790 (1985).

Id. at 791.
Id. at 793.

2012]1

FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

859

The Court acknowledged that the proper first step in
deciding the case was to decide the "forum" in which the
petitioner wanted to speak."o While it was urged on the Court
that the forum was the federal workplace, the Court instead
stated,
[Florum analysis is not completed merely by identifying the
government property at issue. Rather, in defining the forum we
have focused on the access sought by the speaker. When
speakers seek general access to public property, the forum
encompasses that property. In cases in which limited access is
sought, our cases have taken a more tailored approach to
ascertaining the perimeters of a forum within the confines of
the government property.81
In other words, the Court defined the forum in the way that
best described the role in which government was acting. The
purpose of the CFC, and not the mere geographic situs,
determined the role in which government was acting, the extent
of its duty to accommodate speech, and thus the forum. In Board
of Education v. Pico, the Court again defined the relevant forum
not by reference to the geographical situs nor by reference to the
type of access sought by the private party, but directly by
reference to the type of action the government was taking.82 It
addressed a claim that the board of education violated the First
Amendment by removing books from the library.83 In doing so,
the Court suggested that the library's determination of which
books to acquire warranted a non-forum analysis. But its
determination regarding which books to remove required a
public-forum analysis, subjecting it to stricter standards.84 To
come up with what it believed was an appropriate application of
the forum doctrines, the Court drew a distinction between what
looked like the exercise of proper proprietorial discretion in
building up a collection, and the removal of certain books, which
looked a lot more like regulation. 8 5
80

Id. at 797.

Id. at 801 (citations omitted) (stating that State school boards must exercise
their regulatory power in a manner that comports with the First Amendment).
82 457 U.S. 853, 863-64 (1982).
81

3 Id. at 857-58.
* Id. at 870-71.
85 "[We do not deny that local school boards have a substantial legitimate role
to play in the determination of school library content. We thus must turn to the
question of the extent to which the First Amendment places limitations upon the
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In other cases, the Court has referred to its forum analysis
by analogy. For example, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia," in analyzing the use of a university's
student activity fee to fund student publications, the Court
defined the fund as a public forum, noting that it was "a forum
more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but
the same principles are applicable."" In other words, once the
university established a fund from which virtually all student
publication could draw, any actions the university took to restrict
or exclude particular publications from the fund looked like
regulation. The majority did not see the university simply acting
on its own behalf by funding only a few student publications that
it desired. Similarly, in Board of Regents of University of
Wisconsin System v. Southworth, the Court did not define a fund
open to virtually all student organizations using standard forum
analysis, but it explained,
Our public forum cases are instructive here by close analogy.
This is true even though the student activities fund is not a
public forum in the traditional sense of the term and despite the
circumstance that those cases most often involve a demand for
access, not a claim to be exempt from supporting speech. The
standard of viewpoint neutrality found in the public forum cases
provides the standard we find controlling. We decide that the
viewpoint neutrality requirement of the University program is
in general sufficient to protect the rights of the objecting
students. 88

discretion of petitioners to remove books from their libraries." Id. at 869. "[Tlhe
action before us does not involve the acquisition of books. Respondents have not
sought to compel their school Board to add to the school library shelves any books
that students desire to read. Rather, the only action challenged in this case is the
removal from school libraries of books originally placed there by the school
authorities, or without objection from them." Id. at 862.
86 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
a Id. at 830.
8 529 U.S. 217, 229-30 (2000) (citations omitted).
See also Ark. Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, where the Court explained, "The televised debate
forum at issue in this case may not squarely fit within our public forum analysis, but
its importance cannot be denied. 523 U.S. 666, 692 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted). Indeed, a plurality of the Court recently has expressed reluctance
about applying public forum analysis to new and changing contexts." Id. at 692 n.16
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Essentially, in those cases where government was regulating
rather than merely acting on its own behalf, constitutional
questions arose because government had a duty to avoid
restricting speech. Referring to the public forum was a simple
way to make that statement.
This flexibility of the definitions of different fora seem both
appropriate and necessary to allow the doctrines to serve their
purpose-to represent the court's determination of whether
government is regulating or simply acting legitimately on its own
behalf, in which case it has no duty to individuals with respect to
their speech.
The Real Cause of Problems: Misapplication of the Doctrines
Despite the common sense behind the forum doctrines, those
doctrines have come to represent incoherence and complexity in
free speech jurisprudence rather than anything remotely
resembling common sense. 89 The problem is that sometimes,
rather than determining the role in which government is acting
and using a forum to represent that role, the Court first
determines the "forum" by reference to factors exclusive of and
unrelated to the role in which government was acting, and then
uses that definition to determine the extent of government's duty
to accommodate speech. In other words, rather than using the
forum doctrines as convenient labels to describe the role in which
government was acting and whether or not government had a
duty with respect to speech, the Court sometimes reverses the
process. By occasionally giving the doctrine importance well
beyond its appropriate role, and by defining the forum in a way
that virtually guarantees that the doctrine will be applied in a
way that is unrelated to its actual legitimate purpose, the Court
has made the forum doctrines seem complicated, haphazard, and
rootless.
The most obvious case where this has happened is
7.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee

("ISKCON"). In that case, government limited the speech of
Krishna devotees in the public areas of an airport.o The Court
upheld the speech restriction because it determined that an

89 Suzanne Stone Montgomery, When the Klan Adopts-A-Highway: The
Weaknesses of the Public Forum Doctrine Exposed, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 557, 557-58
(1999).
90 505 U.S. 672, 674-75 (1992).
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airport was not a public forum. 9 ' In defining the forum, the
Court completely ignored the role in which government was
acting. Instead, it explicitly relied on the history of aviation and
geographical situs to reach its conclusion.9 2 It gave as its
primary justification that "airport terminals have only recently
achieved their contemporary size and character . .. [so that an

airport]

hardly

qualifies

for

the

description

of having

'immemorially . .. time out of mind' been held in the public trust

and used for purposes of expressive activity."9 3
Of course, historical context can be useful in explaining the
role in which government is acting. To return to earlier
examples, in parks and on sidewalks, government's role as
proprietor is typically restricted to maintaining the physical
integrity of the area and ensuring general public safety through
adequate police and fire protection. Because speech restrictions
do not appear to be any part of government's role as proprietor of
these "public fora," any such restrictions are generally frowned
upon. The historical use of these areas is indicative of the extent
to which government is fulfilling its legitimate function as
proprietor-for example, as a legitimate proprietor when
granting permits for use of a park field, but not when it grants
permits for exclusive speech on a sidewalk.
In other words, to the extent that location and historical use
give relevant background to determine whether or not
government is acting within its legitimate proprietary capacity,
they can provide useful guidance in determining the role in
which government is acting. On the other hand, elevating
historical use and physical area to primary significance, as the
Court did in ISKCON, leads to confusion. It suggests, for
example, that what can be done in a library depends not on
whether government is removing books or spending to acquire
new ones, or on how it decides to bias its future collections, but
on what libraries have done in the past; it suggests that because
a park is historically a public forum, the geographical situs of the
park and nothing more determines what speech restrictions are
acceptable, so that signs saying "park closed" when the park is
91 Id. at 680-81.
92

Id.

93 Id. at 680; see also United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 205

(2003), where the majority also made use of the "time immemorial" test for a public
forum.
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open cannot be restricted; it suggests that because a sidewalk is
a public forum, signs directed at cars saying "15 miles per hour"
cannot be restricted even if they are wrong, and that speech may
be restricted more readily on the internet than on a sidewalk or
park simply because the internet is newer.
Unfortunately, once the definitions of fora are separated
from the role in which government is acting, the concepts that
they represent become entirely unhinged from logic, and the
doctrines lead to complexity. Free speech jurisprudence remains
relatively straightforward, so long as holdings such as ISKCON
are understood as cases where Justices relied on technically
literal, but contextually inappropriate, definitions and
applications of doctrine. So long as these cases are understood as
misapplication of doctrine, rather than explanation of doctrine,
the complexity and incoherence of First Amendment
jurisprudence disappears.
The misapplication of forum analysis is not only confusing,
but it is also significant because defining the relevant forum
often determines the outcome of the case. The vast majority of
the time, declaring that the context is a public forum results in
the regulation being struck down." On the other hand, the
Court's declaration that some context is not a public forum can
minimize or eliminate a party's constitutional liability. In this
way, the Court can hold government responsible only for results
9' We do not mean to suggest that the forum doctrines, when properly
understood and applied, solve all problems. Indeed, suggesting that all cases should
or even can be decided by forum analysis puts more pressure on that doctrine than it
can bear and ends up confusing observers more than it clarifies the law. In most
cases, where the Court debates the forum in which speech occurs, the government's
action is neither clearly that of a proprietor or spender or speaker, nor clearly that of
a regulator. It has aspects of both, and that is exactly why the issue is up for debate
and disagreement among the Justices. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness,Inc., 505 U.S. 671.
When forum analysis is used to determine the role in which government is acting
and is simply left out of those cases where it is not helpful-because the role in
which government is acting, and the issue of what, if any, duty government owes to
the speaker is not in dispute, the doctrines are to be straightforward. See, e.g., id.;
Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194. When, in these cases-where there is no need for
forum analysis-judges and Justices neither disregard the temporarily useless
doctrine, nor cabin the doctrine within its appropriate function, but apply the
doctrines in ways that disregard their very legitimate and useful purposes, more
significant problems and confusion arise.
" Stephen K. Schutte, International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee: The Public Forum Doctrine Falls to a Government Intent Standard, 23 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 563, 566 (1993).
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it causes when acting as a regulator while excusing it from
liability when it acts as a speaker or proprietor of its owns
business. The result is that using forum analysis can provide a
seemingly factual justification for what otherwise would likely be
seen as normative judgments that judges might prefer to avoid
announcing.
For example, in United States v. American Library Ass'n, the
Court was faced with restrictions on internet access-primarily
to sexually explicit sites-on computer terminals at the public
library." The majority-made up primarily of Justices who are
most against explicit sexuality in most contexts-decided that
internet access in libraries was not akin to a public forum but
was instead a non-forum, in large part because the internet has
not been around "since time immemorial" and because the library
was "acquiring" sources rather than removing them.97 As a
result, the blocking software could be used without constitutional
scrutiny." The dissent, issued by those generally more tolerant
of sexually explicit material, found that the limitation on speech
was unconstitutional because the context was most like a public
forum; unlike libraries that had only limited funds for books and
were required to make choices in acquisitions, libraries with
internet terminals initially had access to all sites and took
affirmative action to block them.99
Both sides attached significant importance to the
determination of the role in which government was acting. Those
less accepting of sexually explicit speech determined that there
was no "public forum" so that the sexual speech could be
prevented.'00 Those more accepting of sexually explicit speech
found that there was a public forum so that the restrictions
should be struck down.' 0 ' To be sure, the issue is debatable.
More significant, though, is that it is highly unlikely that the real
differences between the conclusions of the majority and the
dissent were the result of their different perspectives of the
forum. Instead, the real disagreements were likely over the
value of sexually explicit speech and the harm such speech
- 539 U.S. 194, 198-99 (2003).
9 Id. at 204-05.
98 Id. at 214.
" Id. at 236-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1o Id. at 205 (majority opinion).
I Id. at 242-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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causes. Relying on forum doctrines allowed them all to adopt
opinions that reflected their real normative differences while at
the same time giving the appearance that those normative
differences were completely unrelated to their decisions.
Other examples where the role of government was at issue
include Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass'n. 0 2 The majority-

again made up of conservative justices-again held that the
context presented in the case was a non-forum.oa As a result, it
found that a limitation on union political speech was not
constitutionally suspect.104 The (liberal) dissenting Justices
suggested that the case seemed more like regulation in the public
forum, so that the limitation on union political speech ought to be
struck down. 0 Again, it is somewhat difficult to believe that the
determinative differences between the liberal and conservative
justices lay in their differing definitions of the particular forum
and not at all on their different views of labor unions.
On the other hand, in ChristianLegal Society Chapter of the
University of California,Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez,

the speech affected was neither sexually explicit communication
nor speech of a labor union, but speech of a Christian group that
excluded nonbelievers.os Not surprisingly, in that case, the
positions of the liberal and conservative Justices were reversed.
It was the liberal Justices who argued that the government was
merely spending money to help certain groups, so that there was
no public forum and the limitation on speech should be upheld;
and it was the conservative Justices who saw the context as that
of a public forum, and argued that the limitation constituted
viewpoint discrimination that ought to be struck down.'
To be clear, we do not seek to debate which side is right and
which side is wrong in these cases. We suggest, instead, that the
straightforward use of a "forum analysis" in these cases is not the
sole reason, or even the primary reason, for the differing results
reached by the different Justices. The correlation between the
substantive outcome the different Justices would favor and the
way they define the forum at issue seems too strong to be
102

555 U.S. 353 (2010).

103

Id. at 359.
Id. at 364.

1'0

10' See id. at 365-70 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 370-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 376-78 (Souter, J., dissenting).

106 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).
10'

Id. at 3000-20.
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coincidental. We suggest that Justices differ significantly in
their opinions concerning what constitutionally justifies
restricting
speech-for
example,
concerns
about the
Establishment of Religion, or concerns about sexual morals-and
whom they feel is most in need of protection-for example,
pregnant women seeking an abortion, or firm and assertive
believers in Christianity. Reliance on technical formalism in the
application of the forum, doctrines avoids discussion of these
normative and political differences.
We believe that the perspectives of all the Justices have
some merit, and we understand that a decisionmaker might want
to marshal as many arguments as possible to support his
decision. The problem is that when used to support substantive
differences and not cabined within their legitimate function of
representing the role in which government is acting and its
correlative duty to third parties, the forum doctrines are pushed
not simply beyond their usefulness, but beyond the ways in
which they make sense. This serves to make the law appear
significantly more complicated than it really is.
B.

Employee Speech

In this Section, we set forth the Court's enunciated test for
restrictions on the speech of government employees, and we
explain the utility and proper function of this test. We show that
when used as a device to determine whether government is
acting as a proprietor or as a regulator-and, as a result,
whether or not government has a duty to allow the employee's
speech-the test is straightforward and easily comprehensible.
As with the forum doctrines, potential confusion can arise, but
only if and when the employee speech tests are not cabined
within their appropriate purpose.
We discuss the notions of content and viewpoint
discrimination at some length later,os but when discussing the
realm of employee speech, one cannot help but notice that the
Court's treatment of content-based restrictions, as opposed to
content-neutral restrictions, is turned on its head. While in most
cases content-based restrictions on speech are likely to be struck
down, in the case of employee speech, content-based restrictions
are generally necessary if a limitation on speech is to be upheld.
10

See infra Part C.
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In this area, "[t]he Court has recognized the right of employees to
speak on matters of public concern, typically matters concerning
government policies that are of interest to the public at large, a
subject on which public employees [may be] uniquely qualified to
comment."'09 On the other hand, statements by a government
employee at work that are not about a matter of public concern
can be punished without any potential constitutional problem.110
In other words, and in exact opposition to the normal rules, it
appears to be only content-based restrictions on employee speech
that can be upheld.
So long as the Court's employee speech test is understood as
simply addressing the issue of whether government is acting as a
regulator-with a corresponding duty to respect speech-or as a
legitimate proprietor in employee speech cases, the doctrine is
entirely sensible. If the government employer is restricting
speech in pursuit of its legitimate proprietary functions, the
restriction is valid; if government is acting outside of those
legitimate proprietary functions, its actions become suspect.
Speech on a matter of public interest is more likely to be targeted
by the employer who seeks to illegitimately restrict speech under
the guise of proprietorship. As a result, the Court will pay
special attention to restrictions of that kind of speech.
This content-based approach to employee speech makes
perfect sense when one keeps in mind its proper function. It can
appear confusing and self-contradictory, though, when the test
becomes unanchored from that function. Consider, for example,
City of San Diego v. Roe."' Roe, a member of the San Diego
Police Department, offered for sale on eBay videos of himself
dressed in a generic police uniform." 2 In these films, he stopped
a car, issued a traffic citation, but then disrobed, masturbated,
and revoked the citation for the apparently interested and
When the Department discovered this
cooperative driver. '
activity, it fired Roe from the force for conduct unbecoming of an
109 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006).
110Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419 ("So long as employees are speaking as citizens
about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that
are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively."); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).

ni 543 U.S. 77 (2004).
112 Id. at 78.
11sId. at 79.
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officer and for immoral conduct." 4 The Court, in a per curiam
opinion, noted when a public employee speaks " 'as a citizen upon
matters of public concern' rather than 'as an employee upon
matters only of personal interest,'" the employee's speech is
substantially protected." 5 Because the Court determined that
Roe's speech was not a matter of "public concern," it upheld his
termination. 116
If Roe is understood as a case in which the Court was
convinced that government was acting within its legitimate
proprietary capacity when it fired Roe, it is straightforward. If
Roe is taken as suggesting that the determination of whether or
not speech is of public concern plays a role beyond that
determination in this case, it could be quite confusing. Although
the Court has acknowledged that "the boundaries of the public
concern test are not well defined,""' it has explained at least that
speech is of public concern when it can "be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community,"" 8 or when it "is a subject of legitimate news
interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and
concern to the public.""' While sexually explicit speech may be
valueless and offensive to many, one would be hard pressed to
show that this kind of speech is not "of value and concern to the
general public." After all, whether or not Justices approve,
Americans do spend significant amounts of both time and money
viewing pornography. Indeed, it may well be that society as a
whole places significantly more value on, and spends more time
with, pornography than it does on political speech.12 0
Another potential problem with an unconstrained
interpretation of Roe is that it would appear that in future cases,
other Roes could avoid being fired so long as, while they are
masturbating in front of the soon-to-be-ticket-free driver in their
pornographic videos, they talk about how some police really do
take sexual favors. Such statements would make the speech be
114

Id.

115 Id. at

83 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
Id. at 84-85.
n1 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (quoting City of San Diego v.
Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004)).
11 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
116

119 Roe, 543 U.S. at 83-84.
120 Frank Rich, Naked Capitalists:There's No Business Like Porn Business, N.Y.
TIMEs MAG., May 18, 2001.
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on "matters of public concern," and as such the speech would
apparently be protected.121 We seriously doubt that the Court
would countenance such results, but they are the results that
would be inevitable were lower courts to apply the employee
speech test literally and without regard to its proper function.
In addition to suggesting that an employee can somehow
immunize speech by speaking about matters of public concern, a
literal interpretation of the Court's employee speech test might
also be taken to suggest that government can constitutionally fire
employees in ways that would appear to be clearly
For example, assume that Employee is
unconstitutional.
overheard talking to her friend in a private conversation saying,
"I don't care about politics or the community or any issues. I
always vote Republican because my parents asked me to." The
Court has explained that in determining whether or not speech is
on a matter of public concern, it must "evaluate all the
circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it
was said, and how it was said." 22 Given that this was said in
private and without regard to any public issues, it would appear
to be of only private concern. In reality, though, if the agency in
which she works then fires Employee because she has said that
she is a Republican, her termination on that ground would not
withstand constitutional scrutiny. 2 3 The termination would
serve no legitimate proprietary purpose, because the speech,
whether public or private, did not interfere with the agency's
functions.

121 Indeed, the inappropriate sexual behavior of officers on duty would clearly be
a matter of public concern even if everything that Roe said was false. The truth or
falsity of statements is an entirely separate issue from whether or not the topic is
one of public concern.
122 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011).
123 Some might be tempted to suggest that the governmental action in this case
might be struck down because of Due Process concerns rather than because of any
concerns having to do with speech-that is, because the Due Process clause would
prevent the government from terminating employees because of their political
affiliation. But the truth is that the termination in this case would be prohibited by
the free speech clause even if the Due Process clause did not come into play.
Consider, for example, the governmental agency that terminated no one simply
because of her political affiliation, but terminated anyone who made her political
affiliation public. It would be the speech, and not the affiliation, that was punished,
so that the First Amendment, and not the Due Process clause, would apply.
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Roe presented a different case not because his speech was
more "private," but because his part-time acting job created too
much of a distraction in and about the department, and
preventing that distraction is a legitimate part of running the
department. 124 The public concern test is not an end in itself and
need not always be followed, but it provides a useful tool with
which to analyze whether the employer is exceeding its
legitimate proprietary behavior.
Garcetti v. Ceballosl2 5 provides another example of how the
employee speech doctrines can be quite sensible if simply
understood in the context we suggest, but also could lead one
astray if elevated to a role that includes more than helping to
answer the question about the role in which government is
acting. In Garcetti, a deputy district attorney was demoted as a
result of having written a memorandum suggesting problems
with a pending case.12 6 The Court determined that when he
wrote the memorandum the way he did, it was in contravention
of the instructions from his supervisor, and as a result, the
termination was constitutionally acceptable. 127 Put in the way
we suggest, to the extent that government is directing its
employees to simply do their legitimate job, it is not "regulating"
and thus has no constitutional duty with respect to speech. The
Court in Garcetti stated that "when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from
It focused on the "as citizens"
employer discipline." 12 8
requirement in previous employee speech cases and determined
that Garcetti could be fired because he was speaking as an
employee rather than as a citizen. 2 9
This focus on the employee as speaking either as a citizen or
as an employee, rather than on the role of government, can
create the same kind of confusion as does the exaggerated focus
on the public versus private speech issue. Assume, for example,
that A, a local government employee, is overheard saying in a
124
125
126
127
128
129

Roe, 543 U.S. at 81.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 414-15.
Id. at 421.
Id.
Id. at 421-22.
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private conversation to a friend that she voted Democratic. She
explains that her vote was the result only of her employment,
and only because the Democratic candidate promised to give
government employees, including her, a salary raise-"I am
voting for X because I'm a city bus driver and X is going to give
me a raise. That's the only reason. I never voted before and I
never will again, but I need that raise." A herself has made it
clear that she was speaking only as an employee and not as a
"citizen," but it is nonetheless highly unlikely that the local
Republican government could constitutionally fire A because of
what she said.
The real underlying issue in this, and other employee speech
cases, is not whether the employee was acting as a citizen or in
some other capacity, but whether government was acting in
pursuit of its own legitimate proprietary goals when it disciplined
the employee. If the government fired her for her asserted proDemocratic vote rather than for job-related reasons, it would be
acting outside of its legitimate role as proprietor/employer, and,
as such, would not be exempted from any duty with respect to the
employee. Again, the case makes perfect sense when seen as
merely a way to determine the role in which government is
acting and, as a result, whether or not government has a duty
with respect to the employee speech. To understand the case as
simply defining and relying on when an employee speaks "as a
citizen" in terms required by the employee speech doctrine would
be to allow doctrines meant as shortcuts to overwhelm, and thus
complicate, a simple and coherent understanding of free speech
law.
A separate line of employee speech doctrine is represented by
the Court's decision in Perry v. Sindermann.so Sindermann was
a teacher in the state college system.1 3' He had been hired
pursuant to a series of one-year contracts.132 He testified before
committees of the Texas Legislature and became involved in
public disagreements with the policies of the college's Board of
Regents, and the following term his contract was not renewed.13 3

130 Perry

v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).

"I1 Id. at 594.
132

Id.

"I Id. at 594-95.
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Sindermann alleged that his non-retention was in retaliation for
his public speech and, as such, violated his rights to free

speech.13 4
In holding that Sindermann's allegations, if proven, stated a
constitutional claim, the Court stated that:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that
even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons .... It may not deny a benefit

to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of
speech."'
At first blush, it seems eminently sensible to suggest that
government can deny a benefit such as employment for no reason
at all, but that it cannot deny a benefit for certain prohibited
reasons. Similar rules exist with respect to discrimination on the
basis of race, gender, and sexual orientation.
There are some significant differences between restrictions
based on speech and restrictions based on race or gender.13 6 Most
significant for our purposes is the fact that while a court would
have to examine government's motive to determine whether a
person's termination was based on her race, religion, or sexual
orientation, at least the issue of whether or not a person has a
particular trait-skin color, religion, or sexual orientation-is
obvious to any observer. However, when the "prohibited" basis
for discrimination is the employee's exercise of a constitutional
right such as free speech, rather than an existing inalterable
classification such as race or gender, the court must decide not
simply whether the employee was fired for her speech, but
whether she had the right to speak as she did in the first place.
134
135

Id. at 595.

Id. at 597.
One significant difference is that while many restrictions on communication
are obviously necessary to enable government to perform its legitimate proprietary
interests, there are few, if any situations in which discriminating on the basis of race
is related to government's pursuit of any legitimate interest. Whether or not the
guarantee of Equal Protection is limited to situations where government is not
otherwise legitimately acting as proprietor is irrelevant, because the very use of race
as a determining characteristic would likely convince any court that government's
enterprise, whatever it is, is illegitimate. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation,
is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary
justification.").
136
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The determination of whether an employee had a
constitutional right to speak as she did in any situation, unlike
the determination of an employee's race or gender, necessarily
depends on the context. To state that government "may not deny
a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech"
means only that government cannot constitutionally deny a
benefit to a person for speaking as she did in a particular
situation if the person had a constitutional right to speak as she
The reasoning is not inaccurate.
did in that situation.1 37
Neither, though, is it helpful. It is simply circular.
To see the circularity of the reasoning, assume that A, a city
bus driver, is fired from her government job for saying "dirty"
words. In order to determine whether A has been punished for
exercising her right to free speech, one must first determine
whether she had the right to say what she said in the first place.
That, in turn, necessarily depends on the context in which she
said it. A likely has the right to speak as she wishes in the
privacy of her home, so if A is fired for so doing, the action is
likely unconstitutional. But what if A spoke her profanities
while working as a bus driver on a crowded city bus? Does she
have a constitutional right to do so? Unless a court can answer
that question, it cannot determine whether or not A was fired for
exercising a constitutional right. To simply state that A cannot
be fired for exercising a constitutional right, then, says nothing
at all about whether A can be fired for doing what she did. It
simply brings us back to the question of whether or not A had a
constitutional right to say what she did in the context in which
she said it.
Our suggested framework puts the issue in a way that is
capable of being intelligently answered. If government was
acting as a regulator, it has a constitutional duty to accommodate
A's speech. On the other hand, government has no such
constitutional duty if it is acting legitimately as the proprietor of
public transportation and as A's employer. In other words, when
government dismisses an employee and the employee claims a
violation of her free speech rights, the Court has no choice but to
determine government's duty to the employee. In turn, the
137 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (holding that an employee did not have a
constitutional right to speak as he did in his capacity as a government employee,
and, thus, there was no First Amendment violation).
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existence of a duty to the employee depends on the role in which
government is acting when it restricts speech. Unless one looks
to the role of government to determine the existence of a duty in
any particular situation, the determination of A's constitutional
rights, and of whether she has been fired for exercising those
rights, is essentially ad hoc.1"'
C.

Types of Speech Restrictions: Time, Place, or Manner;
Content-Based; Viewpoint-Based; and Secondary Effects

1.

The Doctrines
In most speech cases, the result depends not only on the role
in which government is acting, but also on the type of speech
restriction at issue. Even in the public forum, restrictions on the
time, place, or manner of speech will be upheld."'9 Content-based
restrictions and viewpoint-based restrictions will be struck down,
though. 14 0 In a nonpublic forum, both time, place, and manner
restrictions and content-based restrictions will be upheld, 14 1
while viewpoint-based restrictions will be struck down. 14 2 In a
limited public forum, time, place, and manner restrictions will be
upheld, 4 1 content-based restrictions will be upheld so long as
they are reasonable in light of the purposes for which the forum
is being used,14 4 and viewpoint based restrictions will be either
struck down or, at other times, upheld if reasonable in light of
the purpose of the forum.145
Put most simply, viewpoint-based and content-based
restrictions are almost always struck down; time, place, or
manner restrictions are almost always upheld. The next obvious
question, then, is "what do these terms mean?"
The notion of time, place, and manner restrictions exists
because an individual can theoretically use virtually any
behavior to communicate something; as a result, any regulation
of virtually any conduct can have an impact on some person's
138 We do not suggest that ad hoc balancing would be inappropriate. We mean
only that it does not accurately represent what the court has done.
13 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1984).
*4 Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).
141 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,
838 (1976).
142 See id. at 838-40.
143 Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981).
1" See discussion of limited public fora, supra Part I.A.2.
145 See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,
505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992).

2012]

FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

875

communicative efforts, regardless of the government's intent.
For example, laws against battery might not seem related to
speech, but they drastically limit the communicative ability of
those who like to rely on personal physical force to send a
message. Similarly, laws against the destruction of draft cards
may have been enacted for reasons having nothing to do with
speech. But burning a draft card may be a direct and forceful
way to express one's disagreement with the draft to society at
large, a communication that may be severely restricted by those
laws.146 These regulations of conduct that may incidentally and
unintentionally restrict some communication are generally
referred to as time, place, or manner regulations, and are almost
always upheld.14 1
Not surprisingly, "content-based" restrictions are those that
are based on the content of the speech at issue. If, for example, a
speaker is allowed to discuss Capitalism but not Communism, or
Christianity but not Islam, the restrictions will be reviewed

much more harshly.148
Most suspect of all speech restrictions-indeed, so suspect
that the Court has at times stated that they will be struck down
regardless of the government interest at stake-are those
restrictions based on the viewpoint of the speaker. These are
restrictions that might, for example, allow discussion of
146 See generally United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). We express
no
opinion about the Court's conclusion with respect to legislative intent in that
particular case.
147 "The principal inquiry in ...
time, place, or manner cases .. . is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling consideration. A
regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed
neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others. Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it
is 'justifiedwithout reference to the content of the regulated speech.'" Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citations omitted) (quoting Clark v. Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1994)). See also Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 573 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Tihe abiding
characteristic of valid time, place, and manner regulations is their content
neutrality.").
14
"[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it
finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views. . . . Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some
groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the
basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be
based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone."
Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (citations omitted).
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American foreign policy so long as the speaker favored current
policy, but disallow discussion of the same topic--content-by a
speaker who was against current policy. 149
2.

Common Sense Behind the Doctrines
There is appeal to establishing different tests for different
kinds of speech restrictions. By treating some actions, topics or
points of view differently than others, statutes or regulations
provide evidence that the regulation is intentionally restricting
the targeted communication rather than some other behavior or
consequence unrelated to the communication being restricted.o50
Since we suggest that the Court will not strike down government
action in the absence of that intent,15 1 the relevance of content
and viewpoint discrimination to constitutional analysis is
obvious. A finding of discrimination against communication can
properly play the same role in First Amendment cases that a
finding of discrimination against a protected class can play in
Equal Protection cases.
To see this, assume that government prohibits the use of
Styrofoam containers by fast food restaurants because of
environmental concerns. Clearly, this regulation would not
violate the First Amendment; there is no evidence of any
intention to limit communication. On the other hand, if a
regulation allows the use of Styrofoam containers except those
that have some communication on them-for example, words,
sentences, or even pictures-the regulation discriminates, on its
face, against speech.
By allowing the use of Styrofoam
containers that do not communicate, the regulation suggests that
its motivation was hostility to the communication rather than to
potential environmental damage. As a result, it likely violates
the First Amendment.
14 The Court explained the basis for this permanent and apparently undilutable
taint that viewpoint discrimination brings with it in R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 391-94 (1992). It stated that:
[Government] has no ... authority to license one side of a debate to fight
freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.

The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be
expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its
content.
Id. at 392.
150 See id. at 391-92.
151See discussion, infra Part I.C.2.
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Similarly, a regulation that prohibits loud noises in a
residential neighborhood would likely be upheld because a court
would assume that the regulation is intended to provide relative
quiet and is not aimed at communication. On the other hand, a
regulation that prohibited only loud noises incidental to labor
disputes, while allowing other loud noises, would likely be struck
down. The facial content discrimination provides evidence that
the intent behind the regulation was to restrict certain
communication rather than to protect against high noise levels.
Finally, the same intent to target communication is obvious
if, for example, the regulation prohibits only loud noises in
support of labor but not loud noises in support of management.
In that case, the facial viewpoint discrimination again suggests
that it is communication that is being intentionally targeted.
While facial discrimination against speech, or against certain
topics or viewpoints, typically serves as evidence of intentional
targeting of speech, there are also many occasions when
intentional discrimination against speech is constitutionally
acceptable. For example, "fighting words" are a kind of speech
that can be regulated under the First Amendment.152 Their
intentional regulation can be constitutionally justified by the
need to prevent the immediate harm that would be caused by
their utterance.' 3 Indeed, if a limit on fighting words prohibits
additional speech and is not limited to discriminating against
fighting words-content and or viewpoint discrimination-it
would likely be found to be overbroad and unconstitutional.'
Nonetheless, a regulation that prohibits fighting words only
if they mention race-content discrimination-or only if they are
discrimination-would likely be
anti-American-viewpoint
struck down because of that content or viewpoint
In such cases, discrimination against all
discrimination.15
See discussion of protected and unprotected speech, infra Part I.D.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
64 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
15 In R.A. V., the Court stated:
From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other free but civilized
societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few
limited areas, which are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality." We have recognized that "the
freedom of speech" referred to by the First Amendment does not include a
freedom to disregard these traditional limitations. . ..

152
's
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fighting words is justifiable, but discrimination among fighting
words, against only racial or anti-American fighting words, is
not. By targeting only some fighting words, while allowing
others, the content or viewpoint discrimination provides evidence
that the restriction is motivated by hostility to the message or
content of those particular fighting words that are prohibited,
rather than by the need to prevent the harm that is common to,
and that justifies the restriction of, all fighting words. This role
played by content and viewpoint discrimination on the face of a
statute or regulation serves the same function as does the Court's
reference in Equal Protection and Due Process cases to certain
regulations as being "under-inclusive."15 6
In the same way-by pointing out the underinclusiveness of
some action-content or viewpoint discrimination can also
provide substantial evidence that a government agency is acting
outside its legitimate proprietary role, and is thus subject to
constitutional duties. For example, park management might, as
proprietor, prohibit the posting of any signs in order to preserve
the natural beauty of the park. There would be no doubt that
this restriction targeted communication, but there would also be
little doubt that it was doing so in its role as proprietor of the
park. If, instead, the park prohibits the posting only of signs that
criticize the mayor, or only signs about American foreign policy,
its actions will likely come under constitutional scrutiny. While
We have sometimes said that these categories of expression are "not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech," or that the "protection
of the First Amendment does not extend" to them. Such statements must
be taken in context, however, and are no more literally true than is the
occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity "as not being
speech at all." What they mean is that these areas of speech can,
consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their
constitutionally proscribablecontent (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not that
they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that
they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their
distinctively proscribable content. Thus, the government may proscribe
libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing
only libel critical of the government.
Id. at 382-84 (citations omitted).
Similarly, even regulations of those categories of speech traditionally thought of as
wholly outside of the First Amendment, such as assault or fraud, would be struck
down if they were aimed only at fraud or assault that communicated an antigovernment message but did not restrict fraud or assault that contained a progovernment message. See id.
1' See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws,
37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 348 (1949).
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a court might simply point to "content or viewpoint
discrimination" as the problem, there are two different problems
evidenced by the content or viewpoint discrimination in this
One is that it suggests that government is
situation.
intentionally targeting the speech. The other is that this specific
targeting in turn provides strong evidence that the speech
restriction at issue is not a part of any legitimate proprietary
function being exercised by government. The proprietor of a park
may well, as such, seek to preserve natural beauty by restricting
all signs. It is impossible, though, to imagine any legitimate
proprietary function that depends on the content or viewpoint of
the political signs that might be posted in the park. As a result,
the content and viewpoint discrimination is evidence that
government is acting as a regulator rather than as a proprietor.
As such, it has a duty not to interfere with the speech of others.
In other words, the content or viewpoint discrimination suggests
that government is acting as a regulator so that the public forum
standards apply. In turn, because government is acting as a
regulator, content discrimination is impermissible.
Basically, then, the notion of content and viewpoint
discrimination in a statute or regulation can make sense when
seen either as evidence that (1) government is intentionally
targeting certain speech-which generally invalidates a
regulation, but may at other times actually justify a regulation if
the targeted speech is of a kind that makes it subject to
regulation, and/or (2) government's actual reason for targeting
particular speech is something other than an asserted
justification that would suggest the need to regulate more than
just the targeted speech. These, in turn, may be relevant to a
determination of the role in which government is acting, or
whether government is intentionally targeting speech, or
whether an asserted justification for targeting speech is actually
the real justification for the speech restriction.
Problems
These doctrines and their application become confusing for
two reasons: (1) although the presence of content or viewpoint
discrimination is usually apparent in a statute or regulation, and
typically serves only as evidence of the intent or motivation for a
statute, sometimes courts use the terms not to describe facial
discrimination that serves as evidence of intent or motive, but to
3.
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label conclusions regarding intent or motive based on sources
outside of the statute itself; and (2) sometimes courts seem not to
understand that all types of discrimination against speech,
whether it is discrimination against all speech, or only against
certain content, or only against certain viewpoints, can serve
both of the purposes described above, and by so doing they
confuse themselves.
To see how the labels content discrimination and viewpoint
discrimination are at times used to label conclusions about intent
rather than facial discrimination that is merely evidence of
intent, consider Perry EducationAss'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n,'5 1 where a regulation enacted right after a union vote and
pursuant to the new contract with the winning union excluded
the losing union from the school mail system."'8 The majority
concluded that the action was constitutional because it was
viewpoint neutral.'59 It believed that there was no viewpoint
discrimination because the exclusion was based on the status of
the rival union-as not representing any teachers-rather than
1

460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).

158 The

Court described the facts as follows:
Prior to 1977, both the Perry Education Association (PEA) and the Perry
Local Educators' Association (PLEA) represented teachers in the school
district and apparently had equal access to the interschool mail system. In
1977, PLEA challenged PEA's status as de facto bargaining representative
for the Perry Township teachers by filing an election petition with the
Indiana Education Employment Relations Board (Board). PEA won the
election and was certified as the exclusive representative, as provided by
Indiana law.
The Board permits a school district to provide access to communication
facilities to the union selected for the discharge of the exclusive
representative duties of representing the bargaining unit and its individual
members without having to provide equal access to rival unions. Following
the election, PEA and the school district negotiated a labor contract in
which the school board gave PEA "access to teachers' mailboxes in which to
insert material" and the right to use the interschool mail delivery system to
the extent that the school district incurred no extra expense by such use.
The labor agreement noted that these access rights were being accorded to
PEA "acting as the representative of the teachers" and went on to stipulate
that these access rights shall not be granted to any other "school employee
organization"-a term of art defined by Indiana law to mean "any
organization which has school employees as members and one of whose
primary purposes is representing school employees in dealing with their
employer." The PEA contract with these provisions was renewed in 1980
and is presently in force.
Id. at 39-41 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
159 Id. at 49.
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on the viewpoint the group sought to express-its differences
with the other union. 160 The dissent concluded that the exclusion
was unconstitutional because it constituted viewpoint
discrimination-they believed that it was precisely because the
rival union wanted to put forth a viewpoint different from that of
the winning union that it was excluded. 6 ' Neither side based its
argument simply on the face of the regulation. Instead, both
sides looked to other facts and circumstances to justify their
conclusions that the regulation was or was not an example of
viewpoint discrimination.
The fact that the label of "viewpoint discrimination" or
"viewpoint neutral" was used to describe each side's conclusion
with regard to government's intent and motivation rather than to
describe discrimination on the face of the regulation is not itself
necessarily problematic, but it does raise some concerns.
Decisions would be more understandable if Justices used labels
such as "intentional" discrimination and facial discrimination, as
they do in Equal Protection cases, to describe the two different
uses of the term-that is, either as evidence of discrimination or
as a conclusion of discrimination based on different evidence.
But mere confusion in First Amendment cases is nothing new.'6 2
More significantly, the broad use of the labels content or
viewpoint discrimination can obscure the real issues at play in
the case. Ultimately, the difference between the Justices in
Perry was that the majority believed that the regulation was part
of the government's legitimate job as proprietor of the school and
employer of the teachers, and the dissent believed that the
regulation was outside of the school's legitimate proprietary
interest.16 3 Conclusions about the school's target and its intent
are certainly important in making that determination. The
intentional targeting of speech-the second kind of viewpoint
discrimination-is typically not a legitimate proprietary function,
but preserving school property for school business would seem to
be.'" Both the majority and the dissent, however, made the
presence or absence of viewpoint discrimination appear to be the
ultimate legal issue, rather than a factor-albeit an important
Id.
Id. at 65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162 See supra Parts L.A-B.
16 See Perry,460 U.S. at 65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164 See discussion supra notes 55-58.
160
161

882

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:833

one-that influenced their determination of the role in which
government was acting. In fact, if government is legitimately
acting as proprietor, as it does when it teaches that 2+2=4 and
2+2 does not equal 7, it can and often must engage in viewpoint
discrimination; only if government is acting in some other role is
viewpoint discrimination fatal. In other words, the ultimate
issue was whether or not what the school did was a legitimate
proprietary action-an issue that implicates intent as well as
other questions, but clearly an issue that cannot be decided based
only on the presence or absence of viewpoint discrimination.
Indeed, the majority states that the restriction was viewpoint
neutral because it was within government's legitimate
proprietary domain, when in fact if government is legitimately
acting as proprietor its actions do not need to be viewpoint
neutral.
The dissent stated that viewpoint discrimination
condemned the restriction regardlessof the forum involved.'6 5 Of
course, though, if government is legitimately acting as proprietor,
viewpoint discrimination is acceptable. Viewpoint discrimination
does not condemn government action regardless of forum; it
condemns government action only because of the forum. The
result is obfuscation of the real issues in addition to unnecessary
confusion.
Similar to Perry in its use of viewpoint discrimination as a
conclusion about intent is ChristianLegal Society Chapter of the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law v.
Martinez."' The dissent argued that a regulation that excluded
Perry, 460 U.S. at 71-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded:
Because the grant to the petitioner of exclusive access to the internal school
mail system amounts to viewpoint discrimination that infringes the
respondents' First Amendment rights and because the petitioner has failed
to show that the policy furthers any substantial state interest, the policy
must be invalidated as violative of the First Amendment.
In order to secure the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech
and to prevent distortions of "the marketplace of ideas," governments
generally are prohibited from discriminating among viewpoints on issues
within the realm of protected speech. In this case the board has infringed
the respondents' First Amendment rights by granting exclusive access to
an effective channel of communication to the petitioner and denying such
access to the respondents. In view of the petitioner's failure to establish
even a substantial state interest that is advanced by the exclusive access
policy, the policy must be held to be constitutionally infirm. The decision of
the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
Id. (citation omitted).
1- 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2994 (2010).
165
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a Christian group which allowed only believers to join was
viewpoint discriminatory. Although the regulation was drafted
to look like it was based only on status, it was exactly the group's
status as a Christian-believer-only group that meant that the
group represented the unwanted Christian point of view.'67 The
majority reasoned that the group was excluded because of its
status as the only group that was not open to all comers, so that
the regulation, based as it was on status, was viewpoint
neutral. 6 8 The difference between the majority and the dissent
lay primarily in the different motives they attributed to the
government defendant-was it anti-groups that discriminate, or
was it anti-religion?
That the different Justices viewed government's actions
through different lenses, which in turn gave rise to different
conclusions with respect to government's intent in this case, is
neither surprising nor inappropriate.
Using "content
discrimination" or "content neutral" to describe their conclusions,
though, is both confusing and distracting. We are left confused
about what the terms mean, and we are left without any
discussion of how intent can be shown in free speech cases. Is
the standard the same as in Equal Protection, or is the standard
of proof and the evidence required to show intent in speech cases
more lenient because one need only show "content
discrimination" or "viewpoint discrimination"?
More confusing than using content and viewpoint
discrimination sometimes to indicate facial discrimination that is
evidence of intent and other times to label a conclusion with
respect to government's intent-or even about the outcome of the
case-is the Court's use of the terms content and viewpoint
"neutral" to describe regulations that do discriminate on their
face.
There are some occasions where government action
discriminates on its face against certain speech, but where
Justices determine that there is no intentional discrimination. 69
In these cases, rather than simply stating that the discrimination
against speech is not intentional, they often say that the
government action is "content and/or viewpoint neutral."7 0 One
useful result of this labeling is that government action that does
167
'n
169

Id. at 3009-10 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2994 (majority opinion).
See infra notes 172-85 and accompanying text.

170 See infra notes 172-85 and accompanying text.
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not intentionally target speech is upheld, as the Court seems to
believe it should be. Another less useful result is that observers
and courts become even more confused about what content and
viewpoint discrimination and neutrality mean.
One example of this confusing approach was in Hill v.
7
Colorado."' Prior to that case, in Burson v. Freeman,1
2 the

Court found to be content-based, and unconstitutional, an
ordinance that prohibited solicitation of votes and display of
campaign materials within 100 feet of any entrance to a polling
place on election day.13 Similarly, in Boos v. Barry, the Court
was faced with a provision that made it unlawful to
display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted
to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign
government, party, or organization, or any officer or officers
thereof, or to bring into public disrepute political, social, or
economic acts, views, or purposes of any foreign government,
party or organization ... within 500 feet of any building or
premises within the District of Columbia used or occupied by
any foreign government or its representative or representatives
as an embassy, legation, consulate, or for other official
purposes.174
In accordance with its determinations in Burson, the Court
found that this restriction was content-based because,
Whether individuals may picket in front of a foreign embassy
depends entirely upon whether their picket signs are critical of
the foreign government or not. One category of speech has been
completely prohibited within 500 feet of embassies. Other

530 U.S. 703, 719-20 (2000).
504 U.S. 191 (1992).
17
The Court explained,
The Tennessee restriction under consideration . .. is not a facially contentneutral time, place, or manner restriction. Whether individuals may
exercise their free speech rights near polling places depends entirely on
whether their speech is related to a political campaign. The statute does
not reach other categories of speech, such as commercial solicitation,
distribution, and display. This Court has held that the First Amendment's
hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to a restriction on a
particular viewpoint, but also to a prohibition of public discussion of an
entire topic.
Id. at 197.
"1 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316 (1988) (quoting D.C. CODE § 22-1115
(1981)).
171
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categories of speech, however, such as favorable speech about a
foreign government or speech concerning a labor dispute with a
foreign government, are permitted.'
Somewhat akin to the above cases, the Hill Court addressed
a statute that prevented persons from knowingly approaching
within eight feet of an individual who is within 100 feet of a
health care facility entrance, for purposes of displaying a sign,
engaging in oral protest, education, counseling or passing leaflets
or handbills, unless such individual consented to that
approach. 7 6 The Court found that the provision was a contentneutral time, place, and manner regulation for First Amendment
purposes, even if it might be necessary to examine the content of
oral statements made by the approaching speaker to determine
whether the speaker violated the statute.' The Court reasoned
that the statute regulated only places where some speech could
occur, and that the state's interests in protecting access to
medical facilities and privacy, and providing police with clear
guidelines, were unrelated to the content of demonstrators'
speech.7 7 The Court did not address how the regulation of the
places where certain speech could occur is content and viewpoint
neutral when the proscribed places are within 100 feet of a
medical facility, but content and viewpoint discriminatory when
the proscribed places are within 100 feet of a polling place or 500
feet of an embassy. 7 1
Similarly, in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., the

Court upheld an injunction issued by a lower court against antiabortion demonstrators at an abortion facility.8 o The restriction
was aimed at anti-abortion protesters and the court order
delegated to the addressees the power to determine who could
approach them by giving them a choice of consenting or not
consenting to be approached within the restricted area. 181 Thus,
the would-be patient was delegated the opportunity to decide
" Id. at 318-19.

Hill, 530 U.S. at 707.
Id. at 719-26.
178 Id. at 719-20.
179 We do not mean to suggest or even imply that a constitutional review of the
ordinances in Hill, Burson, and Mosley ought to lead to similar results. We mean
only that, to the extent the ordinances differ, it is not in whether or not they are
content-neutral. See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
180 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994).
181 Id. at 773.
176
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who could and could not approach her to speak, and it is quite
likely that she would use that delegated discretion to
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.1 82 In addition, the
injunction was directed at people acting "in conjunction with" the
pro-life demonstrators, so it did not apply at all to anyone who
was pro-choice. The Court upheld the restrictions, explaining
that they were not only viewpoint neutral, but even "contentneutral."
In these cases, there were important issues and questions,
and clearly one of these issues was the motivation of the
governmental entity that imposed the restrictions-the issue
typically addressed in the context of content or viewpoint
discrimination. 8 4 It was not unreasonable for the Court to
determine, in these cases, that government's intention was to
protect women from verbal abuse that might result in significant
health risks, and was not to restrict the message of the pro-life
demonstrators. It was quite confusing, however, for the Court to
not simply present this conclusion directly, but instead to
announce that the restriction that discriminated against content
and viewpoint on its face was "content and viewpoint neutral."
Even more confusing than the Court's use of "content neutral
and viewpoint neutral" to describe restrictions that discriminate
against content or viewpoint on their face, but where the Court
concludes that the apparent discrimination against speech is not
intentional, is the occasional use of the terms "content and
viewpoint neutral" to describe restrictions that discriminate on
their face against speech where the discrimination against
certain speech is intentional, but where the Court finds that the
intentional discrimination is justified. 8 That the Court upholds
these regulations where the targeting of speech is justified is
entirely sensible. That it does so by labeling regulations that
directly target specific speech as "content and viewpoint neutral"
is entirely confusing.
Use of this approach, though, is common. For example, a
person who yells to a responsive crowd, "Kill that man. Violence
is necessary!" while pointing at a particular person, in a
successful effort to get the crowd to take the encouraged action,
2

See supra Parts I.A.2-4.

Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763-64.
See, e.g., id. at 763.
" See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
'

18
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can be punished for unlawful incitement without government
violating the First Amendment.18 6 A person who says, "Don't give
me your money, or I will just walk away and not hurt you" will
not be convicted of assault or robbery, but the person who says,
"Do give me your money or I will hurt you" can be
constitutionally convicted of both.
Similarly, government can constitutionally ban true
threats,1 8' but it cannot ban "true promises." The employer who
constantly says to her employee, "I want to have sex with you
now" is committing unlawful sexual harassment, while the
employer who constantly says to her employee, "I am not
interested in sex" is not.
The fact that in these cases, content discrimination is not
only appropriate but necessary to preserve the constitutionality
of a speech restriction is not itself problematic. Confusion arises,
when, and only because, justices often refer to these speech
restrictions as "content neutral" rather than simply
acknowledging that in these cases content discrimination serves
a different, constitutionally legitimate, purpose than it does in
some other cases.
Another example of this kind of semantic confusion is the
decision in Virginia v. Black.'8 8 There the Court found that a
regulation prohibiting cross-burning with the intent to
intimidate was constitutional, in large part because the history of
cross-burning in this country makes that act such a powerful
message of threat and hatred.18 9 While it might be eminently
sensible to hold that government was justified in restricting
cross-burning, the interesting aspect of this holding was that the
Court found the regulation to be constitutional because it was
"viewpoint neutral."'90 Again, it determined that viewpoint
discrimination is actually viewpoint neutral.
The "secondary effects" cases' 9 ' are also good examples of
this same kind of reasoning.

In Renton v. Playtime Theatres,

Inc., the Court was faced with an ordinance that "prohibit[ed]

"8

See infra Part I.D.1.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
Id. at 343.
18 Id. at 357.
190 Id. at 362.
19
See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986);
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 286 (2000).
18
188
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adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of
any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church,
park, or school." 192 It explained that,
To be sure, the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult
films differently from other kinds of theaters. Nevertheless, as
the District Court concluded, the Renton ordinance is aimed not
at the content of the films shown at 'adult motion picture
theatres,' but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on

the surrounding community. 9 3
The ordinance was upheld because it was content-neutral.1 94 In
other words, although it was obvious that it was exactly the
content of the restricted entertainment that motivated the
regulation, the Justices justified the result they reached by
holding that the speech restriction was content and viewpoint
neutral. Had the Court simply acknowledged that the content
being targeted, albeit indirectly, was of less value and more harm
than other speech-subjecting it to stricter regulation, consistent
with the First Amendment-it could have reached the same
result without leading observers to wonder exactly what
viewpoint and content discrimination actually mean.
While the problems we point out with the use of these
doctrines are basically ones of nomenclature, they nonetheless
add considerably to the confusion surrounding free speech
jurisprudence. It appears that at times the very different roles
played by the terms "content," "viewpoint discrimination," and
"neutrality" even confuse not only which role the determination
plays in each case but also how that determination is reached.
We have seen that content and or viewpoint discrimination can
be used to describe government action that intentionally targets
speech;" but that "content and viewpoint neutral" can be used to
describe intentional targeting of speech that is constitutionally
justified.' 6 The potentially different meanings can make it
impossible to tell what judges mean by the term in any particular
Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 43.
Id. at 47.
1
Again, we do not suggest that the Court was wrong to treat the Playtime
Theatres ordinance differently from the ordinance struck down in Mosley. We believe
only that any differences in the constitutionality of the ordinances are not the result
of differences in their content neutrality.
195 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988); Burson v. Freeman, 504
U.S. 191, 197 (1992).
196 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).
192
193

2012]

FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

889

case. For example, in Hill,"' Madsen,9 s Hastings,9 9 and Perry,2 00
the majority and the dissent argued over content and viewpoint
neutrality, and both sides discussed both evidence of intent and
evidence ofjustification. 201 Neither side made it clear whether its
ultimate judgment was that the government did or did not
intentionally discriminate against speech, or that the
government did discriminate against speech but the
discrimination was or was not justified. One is left not quite
understanding what evidence is sufficient to justify which
conclusion, or exactly what it really was that both sides
concluded.
In terms of free speech doctrine as a whole, the net result of
these cases seems to be that a regulation that manifests
viewpoint discrimination is usually unconstitutional, but
sometimes it is not. Sometimes viewpoint discrimination means
that the regulation discriminates against a certain point of
view.202 Other times, viewpoint discrimination means that a
statute discriminates against a certain subject matter.2 03 Other
times, though, regulations that discriminate against a certain
point of view and a certain subject matter are not viewpoint
discrimination, but are viewpoint and content neutral.20 4
In addition to being confusing, another significant problem
with describing restrictions as "content neutral" rather than
acknowledging the different roles played by "content
discrimination" in these cases is that the debate between the
Justices can morph from the one about whether a restriction on
speech can be justified because of the harm it causes into a
debate about whether the restrictions at issue are content-based
or viewpoint-based, or whether they are content and viewpoint
neutral.
A brief review of relevant cases seems to support the notion
that the differing uses and definitions of viewpoint
discrimination and viewpoint neutrality in different cases have
at least something to do with political values and are not simply
530 U.S. 703 (2000).
512 U.S. 753 (1994).
'9 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
19?
198
200

201
2"
203
204

460 U.S. 37 (1983).
See supra notes 157-85 and accompanying text.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980).
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724-25 (2000).
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technical.
For example, in HillM and in Madsen,"06 the
restrictions were aimed at pro-life protestors whose actions
arguably threatened the health of women seeking abortions.2 07
The more liberal, pro-choice Justices on the Court argued that
the restriction was content-neutral and so should be upheld, and
the more conservative, pro-life Justices argued that there was
viewpoint
discrimination
that
made
the
restriction
unconstitutional.0 On the other hand, in the secondary effects
cases, the challenged restrictions were aimed at sexually oriented
speech.0 When it was sexually explicit speech that was being
treated differently, the roles reversed and the conservatives saw
viewpoint-neutrality and upheld the restriction where the
liberals saw content-neutrality.
Another example is Rosenberger, where the dissent argued
that the case was about establishment of religion, because the
Court for the first time appeared to accept the constitutionality of
the direct funding of religious organizations, and it believed that
by restricting funding to the religious organization, the
university was doing the only thing it could under the
Establishment Clause. 2 10 Rather than weighing the relative
importance of speech and religion where they appeared to be at
odds, the majority simply found viewpoint discrimination and
condemned the university's action on that ground. 2 1 1 Rather
than debate about the relative importance of the need for
pregnant women seeking abortions to be shielded from verbal
assault versus the wishes of pro-life demonstrators to stop those
women, or about the relative importance of free speech and
establishment of religion, judges debate about "viewpoint
neutrality."21 2 Rather than debating the harm caused by sexually

205
206

530 U.S. 703 (2000).
512 U.S. 753 (1994).

Id. at 757-59; Hill, 530 U.S. at 708-10.
Hill, 530 U.S. at 725.
209 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529
U.S. 277, 284 (2000); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 44 (1986).
210 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 863-64
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 845-46 (majority
opinion).
212 Id.; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
207
208

2012]

FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

891

21
oriented communication, they debate about "secondary effects." a
We believe that this is an unnecessarily confusing way to avoid
facing some real value differences among the Justices.
We make no attempt to suggest which side is right in any of
these cases, because that is beside our point. We raise these
cases to show that the very different opinions about speech that
is content and viewpoint neutral and speech that discriminates
on the basis of viewpoint are sometimes based neither on
different ideas of the definitions of content discrimination and
viewpoint discrimination, nor on different conclusions regarding
the facts of the case. Sometimes the different results are simply
the result of different fundamental values held by different
decisionmakers.
Of course, there is no problem with different Justices having
different values, and we do not mean to suggest that Justices
ought not to support their opinions in whatever way they can.
We do mean to point out that when lawyers and judges take
these arguments at face value and accept them as being valuefree judgments about the definition and application of terms such
as viewpoint and content discrimination and viewpoint
neutrality, confusion necessarily abounds. The confusion, in
these cases, is not the result of any fundamental problems with
First Amendment doctrines. It is the result of those doctrines
being misplaced, misused, and unmoored from their own valid
It results in both confusion and
theoretical foundations.
and concerns that separate the
issues
real
the
from
distraction
Justices.
Unfortunately, the Court has never actually explained or
contextualized the different roles of these characterizations, and
that failure has led to a great deal of the apparent complexity of
The Court has never simply
First Amendment doctrine.
explained that the notion of content or viewpoint discrimination
serves several different purposes, and that what it means can
2 14
When it serves
vary based on the context in which it is used.
can be a fatal
it
the purposes of describing underinclusiveness
flaw. Other times it might be used to point out that government
is not acting simply as proprietor but as a regulator; other times

Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 47.
Edward J. Bloustein, The Origin, Validity, and Interrelationships of the
Political Values Served by Freedom of Expression, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 372, 372
213
214

(1981).
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it might be evidence that government is targeting speech; and
still other times it might provide the justification for targeting
speech.21 5 Instead of simply acknowledging these different
applications, the Court has attempted to resolve this apparent
dilemma by twisting the definitions of viewpoint and content
discrimination, and viewpoint and content neutrality, beyond
recognition. 216 This, in turn, has served to significantly muddy
the waters of free speech doctrine.
4.

Time, Place, or Manner Restrictions

a.

Intuitive Appeal

Despite some confusion, there are numerous regulations of
speech that all would agree are legitimate, content-neutral,
"time, place, or manner restrictions." As stated above,
The principal inquiry in ... time, place, or manner cases . .. is

whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys. "The
government's purpose is the controlling consideration. A
regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect
on some speakers or messages but not others.21
Again, there is intuitive appeal to the notion that time,
place, or manner regulations are constitutionally acceptable. As
with both Equal Protection cases and Due Process cases,
government action that unintentionally makes it harder for some
person to engage in a desired activity is typically constitutionally
acceptable.21 8 The fact that the location of a road happens to
make it easier for one person to travel than it does another, or
the fact that legitimate and valid requirements for a government
job may make it harder for one person to gain employment than
it does for another, does not make those government actions
See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra text accompanying notes 195-201.
217 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see also Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 573 (2001) ("[The abiding characteristic of valid
time, place, and manner regulations is their content neutrality.").
218 See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (finding
a New York City restriction on advertising vehicles constitutional absent some
evidence of invidious discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)
(explaining the requirement that the challenged law have a discriminatory purpose
for a valid equal protection claim).
215
216
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unconstitutional. Similarly, if a restriction legitimately aimed at
action such as assault, speeding, or polluting makes it more
difficult for a person to express her views in a particular way, she
nonetheless has no constitutional claim. When used as a
shortcut for a determination that a particular regulation is
intentionally aimed at consequences unrelated to the content or
viewpoint of the speech, the classification of the regulation as one
of "time, place, or manner" is simple and efficient.
Reality
As explained above, some of the difficulty and uncertainty in
free speech doctrine is the result of different decisionmakers
twisting the definition of time, place, or manner regulations to fit
their needs. It appears to us that some of the confusion in this
area is also due to the Court's enunciated test for determining
the constitutionality of these restrictions. Courts state that these
restrictions will be upheld provided "that they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that
they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information."2 19 This test appears to be
significantly more restrictive than a basic rational basis test.
This appearance is quite misleading.
Despite some suggestions that even time, place, or manner
regulations not aimed at communication can be struck down
under the First Amendment,2 20 the outcomes of the cases strongly
suggest that so long as a reviewing court is convinced that
government regulation is not intended to restrict communication,
the fact that the regulation may have that effect will not result in
First Amendment problems.2 2 1 We do not advocate this notion,222
but we do posit that its use explains, greatly simplifies, and
organizes free speech cases to date.
b.

219
220

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
Id. at 294.

221 See supra Part I.C.2; Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role
of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 415
(1996).

The idea that only intentional targeting of speech is constitutionally suspect
accords with the notion of constitutional rights being only limits on government
action rather than actual affirmative guarantees to individuals. In this Article we
are trying only to describe the behavior of the courts, and not to set out our own
theories of the Constitution.
222
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The Court has struck down very few "time, place, and
manner" restrictions, and where they have been, the cases
suggest that the Court did so not because the restriction failed
the test for time, place, and manner restriction, but because the
Court believed that the restrictions were actually intentional, not
neutral, restrictions of speech. In Schneider v. New Jersey,22 3 for
example, the Court struck down ordinances that prohibited the
distribution of handbills on public sidewalks, and the Court
stated that although the ordinance was intended to prevent
littering, it imposed an unjustified burden on freedom of
speech.224 In Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court struck down a
"neutral" ordinance prohibiting people from going door to door to
distribute literature.22 5 In City of Ladue v. Gilleo, the Court
struck down a "time, place, or manner" ordinance that prohibited
homeowners from displaying signs on their property. 226 Each of
these cases is generally viewed as an example of legislation
aimed at something other than speech that, albeit
unintentionally, restricted too much speech. 22
There are no
recent cases in which the Court has struck down restrictions not
clearly and intentionally targeting speech.
Despite the pervasive understanding of these cases as
instances of regulations that were neutral toward speech but
incidentally restricting speech while attempting to regulate some
other activity, both the facts of the cases, and the fact that so
many other regulations that incidentally restrict communication
are treated differently, suggest that the common understanding
of these cases is simply wrong. In Gilleo, the most recent of these
cases, the Court explained that "even regulations [of] ... time,

place, or manner .. . must 'leave open ample alternative channels
for communication.' In this case, we are not persuaded that
adequate substitutes exist for the important medium of speech

308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939).
Id. at 162.
225 319 U.S. 141, 147-49
(1943).
226 512 U.S. 43, 56, 58-59
(1994).
227 See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on
Track Two: Incidental Regulations
of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 933-34 (1993); Michael C.
Dorf, Incidental Burdens on FundamentalRights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1178-79
(1996); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 101
(1987).
223
224
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that Ladue has closed off."22 Most commentators take this as
showing that the Court is uncomfortable with even neutral
regulations that eliminate an entire means of communication.22 9
The fact is that there are numerous instances of government
regulations that eliminate many more means of communication,
and where many more people than were impacted than in Gilleo,
without any problem at all.so
Indeed, had the town of Ladue required that all structures
on private property in excess of one foot high to be completely
covered in either polished marble or glass, it would likely have
made it impossible for any homeowner to post a sign either
unattached to a building-unless she had a spare marble
signpost-or on her building-the outside of the building must be
only marble or glass; no paper or cardboard. Nonetheless, such a
restriction likely would not have resulted in First Amendment
problems. The difference between this regulation and that in
Gilleo is not how much speech the regulations restrict, but the
fact that the regulation banning the posting of signs looked as if
it were suspiciously intentionally targeted at communication.
In addition, tax and employment laws that make it
impossible for some people to accumulate enough money to
acquire property, and property laws that forbid non-owners of
property from posting signs on property owned by others, limit

228

512 U.S. at 56 (citations omitted) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-

Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).

229 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 227, at 1200-01; Stone, supra note 227, at 114. We
have no doubt that regulations that entirely eliminated certain mediums of
communication would be struck down quickly. Regulations that banned talking on
the phone or communicating by email or text messaging would certainly not last
long-because it would be clear that they targeted speech. If the Court actually did
believe that eliminating an entire medium of speech was enough to invalidate a
particular regulation even though that regulation did not target speech, the result
would be quite similar to the Court's jurisprudence in due process and the takings
clause. In Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, the Court held that a regulation that
rendered a property completely without value could not be sustained. 505 U.S. 1003,
1031-32 (1992). If the Court held that a regulation that rendered a mode of
communication completely without value, a clear analogy exists. Interestingly, the
extreme rarity with which economic regulations are struck down just about matches
the rarity with which "incidental" restrictions on speech are struck down-almost
never.
230 See infra Part I.D.1.
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those non-owners in the same way that the restrictions in Gilleo
limited the homeowners there. Nonetheless, no such laws have
ever been struck down. 23 '
Similarly, towns and rural areas that have no sidewalks or
public parks and as a result have no areas for leafleting are not
as such unconstitutional, despite the fact that residents have no
more ability to communicate than did the residents in
Schneider.23 2 And laws that allow homeowners to prevent
anyone from coming on their property for any purpose at all,
including solicitation, are upheld despite the fact that they
restrict solicitation as much as did the non-solicitation laws in
Struthers.2 33
What made the laws in Schneider, Gilleo, and Struthers
suspect was not the fact that they unintentionally restricted too
much speech while targeting behaviors unrelated to speech.
Instead, what tainted the restrictions in these cases was more
likely the fact that in each of these cases the restriction was
indeed aimed at speech. Just as content discrimination suggests
to courts that some restriction is aimed at restricting
communication, each of the regulations in these cases was drawn
narrowly around speech-related activities while leaving
unregulated non-speech activities that were equally likely to
result in the harm government suggested it was seeking to
prevent.23 4
Consider, for example, if the government in Schneider had
not simply restricted the distribution of handbills, but had
instead restricted "the transfer by any person of any object that
the transferor knows or has reason to know may be used to litter
public property." Such a restriction would have addressed the
town's concern in Schneider, but it would not have singled out
communicative activities for regulation. It would have applied to
fast food containers and cigarette butts as well as to leaflets, and
likely would not have been found to violate the First

231 See City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 811-12
(1984) (highlighting the distinction between public and private property with regard
to First Amendment jurisprudence).
232 See Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 148 (1939).
233 See Otwell v. State, 850 S.W.2d 815,
818 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
23 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43,
46-47, 58-59 (1994); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142-44 (1943); Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160-62, 164.
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Amendment.23 5 Similarly, if the city of Struthers had prevented
all people from entering on and intruding into the property of
another, rather than preventing only door-to-door distribution of
literature, it is likely that the result would have been much
different. The former simply does not target speech in the way
that the actual regulation in that case did.
All of this suggests that the Court's decision to strike down
the government action in each of these cases was not the result of
incidental effects on speech, but was instead the result of facial
discrimination against certain kinds of communication in the
statutes at issue. Restrictions aimed at signs, or at solicitation,
or at leaflets, target some aspect of speech on their very face.
Interestingly, the Court's opinions seemed to ignore the facial
discrimination against speech in each of these cases, despite the
fact that it provided a simple, straightforward basis for the
outcome that would have been more in line with the rest of the
Court's free speech jurisprudence.
We suggest that this may
be simply because the Court confused itself with its own
definition of "neutral" time, place, and manner restrictions.
As explained above, time, place, or manner restrictions are
those that "are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech."2 37 As a result, the Court concludes that they
do not intentionally target communication so cannot violate the
free speech clause.2 38 The problem with this reasoning is that the
conclusion is not always correct. Time, place, and manner
restrictions target neither the content nor the viewpoint of
communication, but that does not make them in all cases neutral
towards communication or speech. In Schneider, Gilleo, and
Struthers, the regulations targeted not the substance-content or
viewpoint-of speech but the means of speech. 2 39 They were not
restrictions aimed at something other than communication that
incidentally burdened speech. Instead, they were aimed directly
at methods of communication: signs, solicitation, and leafleting.
They were not aimed at clutter, or litter, or noise, or intrusions
on privacy. They were, on their face, aimed only at means of
235 Such a broadly sweeping restriction on the transfer of property might raise
due process problems, but would not implicate the First Amendment.
236 See Kagan, supra note 221, at 491-92.
237 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984).
238 Id. at 298-99.
231 See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 53; Martin, 319 U.S. at 142; Schneider, 308 U.S. at
154-57.
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communication that may have contributed to the perceived
harms.2 40
Discrimination against an entire form of
communication may be neutral with respect to content or
viewpoint, but it is far from neutral with respect to
communication or speech. This, and not incidental effects, was
the problem with the restrictions in Schneider, Gilleo, and
Struthers.
D.

Unprotected Speech

1.

Intuitive Appeal
As discussed above, if a court determines that a regulation
intentionally targets communication, it will hold that regulation
to a relatively high level of review.2 4 1 Basically, the Court has
announced that the regulation will be struck down unless it
narrowly targets speech that is "unprotected."2 42 The kinds of
speech referred to as "unprotected" include incitement,24 3 fighting
words,2 " "hostile audience" cases, 245 assault,246 obscenity, 247 child
pornography,24 8 defamation,24 9 and true threats.2 50 Categories
such as obscenity and fighting words have frequently been
referred to by the Court as having little if any social value.25 1
Categories such as fighting words, assault, defamation, and
obscenity have been described as causing harm by their very
utterance.25 2 Incitement and hostile audience cases involve
speech that will cause listeners to immediately engage in

See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 46, 48; Martin, 319 U.S. at 143-44; Schneider, 308
U.S. at 162-63.
241 See supra Part I.C.2.
242 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
960-61, 997, 1017 (4th ed. 2011).
243 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(per curiam); see generally
240

KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989).

See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1951).
246 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 363 (2003).
247 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
2
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
249 See Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the
American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 50 (1983).
250 Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
251 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942).
252 Id. at 572.
244
245
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criminal conduct.25 3 Each of these categories, then, describes
speech that causes a harm that, when compared to the benefits of
allowing that speech, justifies its regulation.
As the other categories and classifications that seem to
pervade free speech law, these categories of "unprotected speech"
have intuitive appeal. They provide categorical shortcuts on
which courts can rely to determine whether particular
regulations of speech are justified. Courts need not re-evaluate
the compelling nature of the government's interest in each case;
if speech is unprotected, its intentional restriction is justified.
Indeed, the Court has been explicit in its demand for application
of categories and has made very clear its decision to respect this
categorical approach rather than to permit any sort of case-bycase, or even categorical, balancing.2 54
2.

Problems
As does the use of any categorical approach, the utility of the
labels "unprotected speech" and "protected speech" has limits.
First of all, such labels seem to ignore several cases where the
Court has openly acknowledged its application of a cost-benefit
analysis. For example, in Snyder v. Phelps, Phelps and several
other members of his church made a practice of picketing
funerals of American servicemen killed in battles in order to
show their displeasure with the United States. 255 On the day of
one such memorial service, they picketed on public land adjacent
to the soldier's funeral.25 6 They carried signs that stated, for
instance: "'God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,' 'America is
Doomed,' 'Don't Pray for the USA,' 'Thank God for IEDs,' 'Thank
God for Dead Soldiers,' 'Pope in Hell,' 'Priests Rape Boys,' 'God
253 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315, 320 (1951).
254 In United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010), the Court
explained that,
The Government thus proposes that a claim of categorical exclusion should
be considered under a simple balancing test: "Whether a given category of
speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical
balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs."
As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence is
startling and dangerous. The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech
does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.
Id. at 1585 (citations omitted).
255 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011).
256

Id.
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Hates Fags,' 'You're Going to Hell,' and 'God Hates You.' "257 On
appeal from a jury finding that this action constituted intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the Court announced, "[Tihis case
turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private
concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.
'[Sipeech on "matters of public concern". . . is "at the heart of the
First Amendment's protection"'. .. and is entitled to special
protection."2 58 The same favoring of speech on public concern
over speech of only personal interest is evident in the employee
speech cases.259 Similarly, the secondary effects cases, while not
based on the public-private distinction, are explicit in the lower
value they assign to sexually explicit speech.26 0
More
problematic
than
the
Court's
apparently
straightforward application of cost-benefit analysis is that at
other times, while proclaiming that it is applying a clear
categorical approach not subject to balancing, the Court does not
simply apply those categories, but manipulates them to achieve
the results that would arise from a balancing approach, and it
ends up substituting for a direct cost-benefit debate a debate over
whether the speech being restricted falls into one of the
"unprotected categories." For example, fighting words have long
been, and continue to be, unprotected speech, so that they can be
regulated.2 6 1 Over time, though, the Court has become somewhat
more protective of the kinds of offensive speech that arguably fit
within the original definition of "fighting words."2 62 As a result,
in several cases involving speech that would have fit within the
original definition of fighting words, the Court concluded that
protecting listeners from the offensive speech at issue did not in
fact merit restricting the speech.2 63
Rather than simply
announcing that the result of its cost-benefit analysis was its
determination that the restriction at issue ought to be struck
down, the Court determined that the speech being regulated in

Id.
Id. at 1215 (citations omitted).
259 See supra text accompanying notes 111-16.
260 See supra discussion of secondary effects accompanying
notes 191-93.
261 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942).
262 Id. at 573; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
20 (1971).
263 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989); Cohen, 403 U.S
at 21; Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
257
258
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these cases was not "fighting words."2 M It substituted a
definitional debate-is the speech "fighting words"-for a more
straightforward cost-benefit analysis.
Another example of substituting a definitional issue for a
balancing issue is Virginia v. Black.265 Barry Black led a Ku Klux
Klan rally, attended by twenty-five to thirty people, on private
property-with the permission of the owner, who was in
attendance-that was located on an open field just off a state
highway.26 6 He was convicted of violating a statute that made it
unlawful for "any person or persons, with the intent of
intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to
be burned, a cross on the property of another."2 67 The Court
upheld the speech restriction because it banned only "true
threats," an unprotected category of speech.2 68 The "discovery" of
this new category of "unprotected" speech looks very much like
the application of a balancing approach-where the Court found
that the speech restriction was worthwhile-than like a
discovery of an unprotected category of speech.
Of course, the substitution of a definitional debate-whether
some particular communication falls within the definition of a
particular category of unprotected speech-for a more direct, less
categorical, cost-benefit analysis of the particular communication
is often not problematic and can be quite useful. But it can
become seriously confusing and distracting when the Court uses
the definition of unprotected speech for purposes in addition to
substituting for a categorical cost-benefit analysis. For example,
because "incitement" is typically followed by criminal penalties,
the Court has explained that whether or not speech is
"incitement" depends, in part, on the intention of the speaker.2 69
Speech is not unprotected "incitement" unless the speaker
intends-and is likely to-cause imminent lawless action. Thus,
the definition of incitement not only includes the results of a costbenefit analysis-the determination that the harm resulting from
speech that is likely to cause imminent lawless action outweighs
the benefits of allowing that speech-but it also provides
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20; Street, 394 U.S. at 592.
538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (stating that burning the flag constituted a true
threat under the particular circumstances).
266 Id. at 348.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 359-63.
269 Id. at 362-65.
264
265
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guidance to legislatures about how to ensure that regulations of
incitement will satisfy Due Process as well as the First
Amendment, and it guarantees that no person will be convicted
of a criminal offense without the requisite mens rea necessary for
the application of criminal penalties.
In terms of the limits imposed only by the First Amendment,
the hostile audience cases make it clear that government can
prevent speech when such action is necessary to protect a person
from imminent violence, regardless of the speaker's intent. 70
Thus, in terms of the right to freedom of speech, if government
has a compelling interest in preventing imminent lawless action,
the speaker's state of mind can make speech neither less
dangerous nor less subject to regulation.
Doctrine becomes confusing when government's interest in
protecting
the community from imminent harm is
inappropriately conflated with the speaker's state of mind, and
analysts lose track of what it is they ought to be analyzing.27 2 In
fact, incitement, fighting words-to the extent they are
unprotected because they will evoke a violent reaction-and
hostile audience cases are all examples of situations where
speech can be regulated because government has no other way to
prevent violence--other than spending on extra police, and the
Court apparently believes that the constitution does not require
government to spend money to guarantee rights.27 3 To the extent
that defining these as different kinds of "unprotected" speech
cases leads people to believe that the First Amendment, rather
than the Due Process clause, demands that they be treated
differently, doing so is unnecessarily confusing.27 4
Child pornography is another area of unprotected speech,
and is also another area where classification of child pornography
as "unprotected speech" becomes confusing. In originally holding
that child pornography was unprotected speech, the Court
bolstered its argument by pointing out its relative lack of

Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1951).
See id.
272 Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity, True
Threats, and the First Amendment,
36 CONN. L. REV. 541, 543 (2004).
273 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991); see discussion
supra
Part II.D.1.
274 Similar discontinuities arise, of course, in defamation
cases.
270

271
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value, 27 5 and if one is determining whether or not certain speech
is "protected," analyzing the value of that speech seems
eminently sensible. On the other hand, a few years later, in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,2 76 the Court explained that its
actual basis for upholding the anti-child pornography statute at
issue in Ferber related only to "how it was made" and had
nothing to do with the actual communication at issue in that
case. 277 As a result, child pornography that was computer
generated or otherwise did not involve real children in its
production was protected speech.27 8
Once again, free speech jurisprudence becomes complicated
not simply because there are categories of unprotected speech,
but only because, and only when, those categories actually take
into account factors other than the First Amendment. While it
may well make sense to hold that the use of videos that were
made by sexually abusing minors can be restricted while also
holding that films made by the use of "virtual" children cannot be
so restricted, it is confusing to do so by holding that films made
using real children are "child pornography" and therefore
unprotected speech, while films using virtual children are not
child pornography, so are protected speech.27
The most fundamental problem with relying on a definition
of child pornography that includes as unprotected speech only
videos that use real children is that a film shown by the same
person to the same audience may or may not be "protected
speech" based on how the film was made. The actual "speech" of
the person who shows the film is identical in either case. What
differs is nothing about the content of the video, but only whether
production of the video was itself criminal conduct. If it was,
then mere possession of the video can be criminalized, regardless
of whether it is shown to anyone or not. If it was not, neither the
possession nor the showing can be criminalized.
In reality, then, the production or possession or display of
films made using real children engaged in sexual conduct can be
regulated not because of anything having to do with the "speech,"
275 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982) ("The value of permitting live
performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual
conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.").
276 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
277

Id. at 251.

278

Id. at 251-53.

279

Id.
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involved, but because of the unlawful production process-a
restriction that seems to more closely resemble a content-neutral
time, place, or manner restriction than an "unprotected speech"
category. The Court's approach-calling child pornography
"unprotected speech" and then defining child pornography
without regard to the actual communication or speech involvedmay not change the outcome of cases. It does, however, bring
additional confusion to those searching for a fundamental
understanding of free speech law.
Obscenity is also unprotected speech, but, as with
incitement, it has problems in that it substitutes a definitional
debate for a debate about values and justifications. As with child
pornography, the definition of what "speech" constitutes
obscenity involves factors in addition to mere speech. Under
Miller v. California, what is "obscene" depends in part on
whether the decider believes that the work appeals to "prurient
interests," and, to paraphrase the Court, one person's "prurience"
is another's "normal turn-on."280 Similar evaluations must be
made about whether the work is patently offensive to determine
whether or not it is obscene. 28 ' Again, at best, changing the
debate from a cost-benefit analysis to one about whether certain
material is or is not pornography-which is likely to be decided
by weighing the harm from the speech-does nothing to make
the analysis easier. At worst, defining obscenity as unprotected
and then focusing subsequent judicial focus on whether or not
something is obscenity directs discussion away from the real
underlying issue: is obscenity really so shameful and offensive
that it can be constitutionally prohibited, or is sexual explicitness
not so bad?28 2 We do not here wish to weigh in on either side of
that debate, but we suggest only that, with respect to obscenity,
it is the appropriate debate to have and it is the debate that

280

413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).

Id.
By defining obscenity as including only speech that is both prurient and
patently offensive, the Court has made it clear that the substantial harm-shame
and offense from exposure to the communication-is not simply imminent, but is
inherent in the communication itself. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942). If people are not both offended and shamed by exposure to the
communication, it is not obscenity and, as a result, not easily regulated.
281
282
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actually separates the opinions of the different Justices.2 83 The
current attitude towards protected and unprotected speech will
likely provide a simple way to avoid that debate entirely.
2"3 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Decisions and scholarly
arguments focus on issues such as whether obscenity is "speech," because it
"bypasses the brain and goes directly to the groin." See generally Frederick Schauer,
Speech and "Speech"-Obscenityand "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretationof
Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979); Cass R. Sunstein, Words,
Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1993). Or on whether it is not like other
speech because it cannot be rebutted by counter-speech, see generally HARRY M.

CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: CENSORSHIP IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY (1969).

Or whether it is somehow of less value than other speech, see generally Young v.
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973). See discussion of this issue in David Cole, Playing by Pornography's
Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1994); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Stephen
G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornographyas Act and
Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564 (1988); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity
Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975).
If one is functioning in a world where the real question is whether obscenity should
be "unprotected," these efforts to distinguish the quality of communication when the
content is "obscene" all make sense.
Unfortunately, although perhaps creative and brilliant, none of these arguments
about the "quality" of obscene speech is convincing. Obscene material goes through
the brain as much as any other; and just as with all other visual perceptions, it is
the brain that processes the material and stimulates the emotive or physical
response. The economic value of obscenity is undeniable to anyone familiar, on any
level, with the sex industry. Billions are spent annually on obscene materials, and
numerous major corporations reap significant profits from pandering in obscenity.
Phil Kloer, Upscale Vendors Cash in on Porn, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 17, 2003, at
1A. In a market-driven economic system, disregarding this obviously significant
market value seems disingenuous at best. More recently, with unabashed porn stars
and porn peddlers going into politics and stressing their participation in
pornography as both a personal qualification and an important political issue, it
seems clear that obscenity even has some political value, at least in the minds of a
few of those running for office and/or casting votes. See Larry Flynt Announces Run
for California Governor, CNN POLITICS (Aug. 4, 2003), http://articles.cnn.com/200308-04/politics/flynt.governor_1_-hustler-magazine-publisher-larry-flynt-flyntpublications?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS.
While it is true that the effect of exposure to obscenity cannot be undone by
"logical" counter-speech that can convince the viewer that the obscenity was
somehow "incorrect," the same is generally true of every other kind of speech. Much
advertising, both commercial, and more importantly political, as well as religious
speech (prayers are often seen as a kind of meditation rather than a kind of thought
process), violent speech, and art cannot be effectively rebutted by logical counterspeech. Indeed, the power of even the most logical arguments usually lies not in
their logic itself, but in who presents them, how they are presented, and the
relationship between the presenter and the listener. As a result, very often the
exposure even to simple illogical argument cannot be undone by logical counterargument, and the exposure to mistaken facts cannot be undone by subsequent
exposure to the truth. Even casual observance of many advertising or even political
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Another result of categorizing "obscenity" as unprotected
speech, as opposed to simply stating that obscenity can be
regulated because it immediately induces shame and offense in
the observer, is that the definition of obscenity misdirects and
confuses First Amendment analysis. Because the Court in Miller
was deciding on the constitutionality of a criminal provision, it
had concerns aside from the speech at issue, including some
concerns about due process, clarity, and notice to the defendant
with respect to the prohibited conduct.184 As a result, when it
defined "obscenity" it included in its requirements "sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law."2 85
Defining the constitutionality of a criminal law by reference to
the specificity and clarity of a statute makes sense. Defining a
category of "speech" by reference to the specificity of a statute
does not. It serves primarily to confuse.
Similar problems arise in the Court's current definition of
protected commercial speech. With respect to such speech, the
Court asks, "iAls a threshold matter whether the commercial
speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. If so, then
the speech is not protected by the First Amendment."8 6 While
the determination of whether speech is misleading obviously
depends on the speech itself, the determination of whether
commercial speech concerns unlawful activity often depends not
on what is said, but to whom it is said. For example, numerous
products, including alcohol and tobacco, are lawful products for
adults, but unlawful for minors. Again, it is entirely sensible to
suggest that whether restrictions on speech are constitutional
can depend on context, including the person to whom the speech
is addressed. All that does not make sense in this case is the
apparent notion that the constitutionality depends on the nature
of the "speech" as protected or unprotected, or as commercial
speech or noncommercial corporate speech,28 7 rather than on
government's justification for restrictingthe speech in the actual
context in which the speech is made. The "speech" that

campaigns bears this out. Regardless of which candidate wins a political campaign,
supporters of both candidates know that approximately one half the voters-those
who voted for the other side-are apparently immune to logic.
28 413 U.S. at 27.
285 Id. at 24.
286 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
357, 367 (2002).
2
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983).
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advertises alcohol and tobacco is the same whether or not minors
are present; government's justification for restricting the speech,
though, is not.
Another problem with the consistent use of categories of
"unprotected" speech is that they imply that these categories of
speech are actually "unprotected," when, in fact, they are not.
Ultimately, as interpreted by the Court, the First Amendment
neither "protects" nor restricts speech; it merely limits
government's ability to regulate speech."* Courts have and will
continue to strike down regulations of "unprotected" speech
because those regulations violate the First Amendment. 28 9 To
stay with cases already discussed elsewhere in this Article, in
R.A. V., the Court struck down a statute that punished only
certain "unprotected" "fighting words." 290 The Court's decision
may make sense, but the Court's articulated doctrine-that
unprotected speech is protected, but only sometimes and only in
some circumstances-is unnecessarily confusing.
On the other hand, some speech that is "protected" can,
depending on the context, cause substantial and imminent harm
that warrants its prohibition. Political speech, for example,
perhaps the "most" protected speech, can be prevented if it takes
the form of advertising in a municipal bus,"9 or advocating too
near a voting booth, 9 or picketing around an individual's
home.29 3 While courts and scholars may debate, in these cases,
the application of "captive audience" 294 and other doctrines, what
they are all looking to, at the end, is simply whether the harm
caused by the speech justifies the restriction. On a few very rare
occasions, the Court simply acknowledges that it is engaging in
straightforward cost-benefit analysis. 29 5 Too often, though, it
does not, and the cost is confusion of what could otherwise be
understood as fairly straightforward free speech law.

See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating a
statute that punished only a certain category of fighting words).
290 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
291 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
29 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
293 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1988).
2
2

294
295

Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723-24 (2010).
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All of these apparent anomalies make perfect sense if the
categorization of unprotected classes of speech is viewed as a
mere shortcut to the real issue, which is simply a cost-benefit
analysis being made by the courts, accompanied by a few nonFirst Amendment concerns that get thrown into the mix. Rather
than viewing some speech as protected and some as unprotected,
by instead explaining that some protected speech can be
restricted; that there are ways in which unprotected speech
cannot be restricted; and that sometimes the secondary effects of
protected speech justify its restriction but at other times they do
not, one might simply observe how the cost-benefit analysis
actually plays out.
The costs of restricting political and
philosophical speech are high, and the value of allowing such
speech is high. But it is not high enough to prevent courts from
restricting it when such restriction is necessary to prevent
imminent violence. The costs of restricting some kinds of
extreme sexual speech-obscenity-are low, the value of that
speech is seen by the Court as very low, and the harm from that
speech is seen by the Court as high. Some other kinds of sexual
speech are seen as less valuable than political speech, but more
valuable than obscenity, and those kinds of sexual speech are the
ones for which the Court has adopted and allowed the secondary
effects test.
This, again, does not mean that the notions of protected and
unprotected speech as shortcuts to indicate kinds of cost-benefit
balancing that the Court has already done are not useful. It
means only that for these notions to be useful, as opposed to
simply confusing, they must be understood with due
consideration of their underlying purpose.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have suggested neither a fundamentally
new understanding of the purpose or function of the First
Amendment, nor a new proposal for applying the First
Amendment. Instead, we have only tried to explain what has
motivated the decisions that courts have already made, and to
explain a framework into which the cases may, for the most part,
be properly fit. We have tried not to suggest what ought to
happen, but to make sense out of what has happened.
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We suggest that in the free speech cases, virtually all of the
different and apparently unrelated and self-contradictory tests
serve as shortcuts to answer one or more of three very specific
questions: (1) in the context at issue, does the government have a
constitutional duty to the would-be speaker or listener"' with
respect to its action-if the government is acting as speaker or
proprietor, it does not; (2) if government has a constitutional duty
with respect to a person's speech, has it intentionally targeted
that speech; and (3) if government has intentionally targeted a
person's speech when it is subject to a constitutional duty, is the
restriction on that speech justified? 9 ' In other words, all of the
free speech tests and doctrines invented and applied by courts
can be sensibly understood as devices to help them address the
issues of duty, intention, and justification.
We believe that putting all of the free speech tests and
classifications into this framework is necessary for several
First of all, without some kind of relatively
reasons.
straightforward and understandable framework that the cases so
far have not set forth, First Amendment law is incomprehensible.
Constitutional analysis and Supreme Court opinions often rely
on categories and tests, especially in areas where cases are as
ubiquitous as in free speech. But without a framework in which
to understand and use these tests, the law appears to be nothing
more than hundreds of little tests for little situations, and each
test, in turn, appears to be virtually impossible to understand.
The tests seem to come from nowhere and to be applied
randomly.
Our suggested framework posits that in reality, these tests
are basically sensible, comprehensible, and unified. The truth is
that the technical definitions and tests are neither as
complicated nor as important as they are often made to appear.
296 We believe that the activity protected by the First Amendment is basically
communication rather than simply speech. We believe this to be the case because the
Court has found the right to be at issue when government has interfered only with
listeners, and not simply when it interferes with speakers.
297 These same three questions-and more-must be answered when the Court
addresses any other Constitutional right, such as Due process rights. In fact,
analysis of free speech cases is inherently simpler than due process cases, because at
least the constitutional interest at stake-communication-is fairly clear. In due
process and equal protection cases the same three questions must be answered, but
the second question-whether government has caused an injury to a constitutionally
significant interest-becomes much more complicated because defining what
interests are constitutionally significant becomes a much more complex endeavor.
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Some of the apparent complexity in First Amendment
jurisprudence arises because judges are not sufficiently
articulate about what they are doing. Some problems arise
because judges feel trapped by enunciated doctrine, and many
problems arise because judges occasionally apply doctrines and
definitions to justify the results they want in particular cases.
If one takes the time to understand both the appropriate
function of the free speech doctrines and the inherent limitations
in the doctrines, First Amendment cases can be understood as
resting on the same basic issues as other constitutional rights.
The issues that arise have to do with government's duty,
government's intention, and government's justification for its
actions. We do not mean to suggest that our framework will
change whether or not any person agrees with outcomes of the
different situations. Instead, we believe that, for now, just
understanding the function and the unity of free speech doctrines
and tests is a huge leap forward.

